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Abstract
The problems and difficulties of developing the tank in
Great Britain during World War I did not stem solely from
reactionary Army officers, as has often been alleged. Rather,
it was part of the greater problem of adjusting the British
nation, governmental setup, and military theory and machinery
to the task of fighting a completely new and very complex
kind of warfare. This adjustment, incomplete or fragmentary
in many areas at the war's end, had physical, intellectual,
and psychological aspects; it had to be effected at least in
part before the tank could be understood and appreciated as
a capable weapon, as a piece of mechanical hardware engineered
to do a particular job, and as a completely new entity on the
scene of contem1porary warfare.
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A single practical idea flashed into somebody's brain--
I don't know whose...-- one single idea, I say, scarcely
new, but nicely adapted to its object, the tank. And
from that was to come victory as Pallas came from the
head of Zeus.
-- Jean de Pierrefeu
And therefore I consider that we were not beaten by the
genius of General Foch, but by "General Tank."
-- General A.D. von Zwehl
PART ONE
A Brief Introduction
and
Description~0T the Problem
The problem of the tank is interesting because it represents one of
the earliest attempts to adapt mechanical methods to warefare. Furthermore,
the tank was probably the first truly revolutionary wea)on to be developed
during a war, and hereby hangs a tale: why this weapon was not, could not
be, developed before World War I is a question to be dealt with in detail,
and must be clearly understood before we can understand the unusually large
and varied gronp of difficulties which beset tank development during 1914-
1918.
These difficulties were not solely the result of opposition and stubborn-
ness displayed by high ranking Army officials, although this is the impression
one gets from much of the published material on the subject. Both pers ra 1
memoirs and scholarly works of a general nature by and large offer this ex-
planation which they all acknowledge to have existed. Most books show that
there were not enough tanks, that generals would not use them properly, that
tanks were ridiculed and not given a fair trial, and so on. What is rarely
touched on in these books, what is not regarded as really part of the problem,
and what this thesis will delve into, is the more elusive type of difficulty,
which the thesis claims is most intimately and definitely part of the problem.
Examples of this include the complete surprise by which the character
of the war itself took the British government institutions; in consequence,
most of the government's solutions to the problems of fighting this war,
including tank development, were perforce impromptu solutions involving
impromptu methods, impromptu organization and impromptu personnel. Another
example is the personality of one man at the center of the administration
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of tank manufacture, whose impatience soon caused previously sympathetic
officials to harden into an anti-tank attitude. Still a third difficulty
was the shortage of materials and personnel, whose acquisition was made
unusually difficult by the poor communication in government agencies due,
in turn, largely to the other two problems just mentioned,
Without going into further detail at this point, we can see that the
tank problem in general can be investigated fruitfully from the premise that
the tank was the particular invention of a particular people at a particular
time in its history. If we view tank development in this way, it will in turn
tell us a great deal about the governmental and military system which pro-
duced it and show us that the system, as constituted, would likely have
behaved in the same way had a repeat of the situation been offered. In
other words, the nature of the system, hardly exterior to the problem, was
indeed central to it. We might even venture to say that the true difficulties
lay in the system itself, and that tank development feflected, was merely
symptomatic of, these difficulties.
Historically, the tank problem must be viewed as a small part of one of
the most enormous problems that has ever faced any nation. It is imperative,
then, that some considerable space be given at the outset to describing the
environment surrounding the tank's birth and early childhood, even in areas
which do not appear to impinge directly. Some of these characteristics devel-
oped throughout the war years; consequently, they will be dealt with right
through to 1918, although the narration of the tank development itself will
begin in 1914.
Central to the approach used in this thesis is the notion that the tank
was a machine. By itself, the tank is symbolic of the industrialization
which was sweeping through and altering all levels of Western society in the
19th century. Although they felt the immediate effects of this great change
quite intimately, most people failed to perceive the new outlook embodied
in the mechanical approach: by substituting machines for men, science was
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shortening communication distances and creating a multitude of new and rev-
olutionary devices and substances which contained power, ability and energy
heretofore unavailable to mankind. We of 1960, being more used to this pattern,
can see more clearly than could Englishmen of 1900 how easily the new creations
of science and industry could be adapted and applied to war.
Perhaps the military consequences of the industrial revolution are second
only to the social ones. As a result of these developments, wars could not
only spring up faster and involve many more people, but they could be fought
much harder than ever before. The interdependence of nations produced by
increased trade and communication was a great influence on the rise of the
net of alliances which dragged so many nations into war in 1914. Even during
the conflict, however, only a few people, among them Germany's Rathnau and
Britain's Lloyd George, realized even in the most hazy fashion that the war
was a war between "the smokestacks", more than between the armies in the field.
Our tank is typical of these developments. Like the nachinegun which it
was meant to destroy, it was the child of the mechanical approach, the attempt
to substitute machines for humans. Like so many other such inventions, its
ability to effect this substitution was badly underrated. Once again we must
remember that this effort to make a fighting engine was one of the first such
attempts to be made by the fledgeling industrialized nations as they embarked
on their first industrialized war.
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PART IWO
The Environment:
A Family Portrait
The background material will be divided into five groups; first the
nature of the British Army and its personnel; secora, descriptions of some
of the key persons involved in the British central government and high Army
command; third, the nature of war at the turn of the century and the devel-
opment of tactics before and during ;Norld War I; fourth, the nature of
British central government including its rise to meet the new kind of war
described in the preceding section; fifth, a description of the three great,
general conflicts which prevailed within the halls of government during those
hectic years. As the complexities of the situation become clearer, the
twists and turns in the path of tank development will, we trust, become
clearer also.
I: The Army
In the 1890's the British Army basked in the sunshine of many glorious
yers of conquest in the far corners of the earth. It was the child of
the aristocracy, which with solemn eagerness sent its sons to become officers.
It is well to remember this when we come to consider the political conditions
in England, for these were also the years of liberalism, and of all the
levelling of society which accompanies such moverients. The training of
young officer candidates at Sandhurst was generally doctrinaire; it was
heavily weighted with apothegms and was guided by a single handbook, the
Field Service Regulations. The FSR was revived rarely and only painfully
for it provided a comfortable refuge and was a genuine answerbook. In it
were enshrined numberless outdated but thoroughly standard methods.
One officer, Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, shows that his training, received
around 1890, tried to instill a strict and unquestioning adherence to the
dogmas of the past; it forced him into standardized thiking which tended
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to eliminate any questioning attitudes, and generally displayed a removed
and unrealistic attitude toward war. When Fuller saw a real battle close
up, he felt like Rip van Winkle, looking up from a twenty year perusal of
the FSR to find things strangely changed.
The soldier, of course, was in a disadvadtageous, position with regard
to progress. He spent most of his time in a world of make believe wars
called maneuvers, for he could not easily manufacture real twars in which to
test his ideas. Since he could rarely see out of his position, and the
civilian or other type of outsider was rarely allowed to see in, he relied.
more and more heavily on past experience which he believed still applicable.
In the generations of peace after 1815, the strategists and generals could
do little but think about Napoleon: his. published apothegas made marvellous
talking material, and so for over 100 years strategists did little but talk
of Napoleon and his philosopher-spokesman, Clausewitz. Unfortunately, the
apothegms were so generalized that while they helped generals to talk and
write FSR's, they turned out not to help them fight. The input of corrective
notions was hampered by the guild complex which obsessed these men, and by
a strong tendency to consider that rank, seniority and wisdom all went to-
gether. There was and likely still is "a deeply rooted bias in the British
fighting services against novel ideas, especially when they emanate from
below. Suggestions from juniors smack of presumption."2
One consequence emerges in common from these comments, and observation of
history confirms it: changes in war take soldiers by surprise; foresight is
made difficult by many factors, and reliable principles to guide strategic
thinking have yet to be found.3 As a result, "battle is unrehearsed, even
unprincipled." This, even though there is much inter-war maneuvering and
practice.4
1. Fuller, Colonel J.F.C., Memoirs of an Unconventional S61dier, ch. 1.
2. Swinton, Sir Ernest D., Eyewitness, pp 96-7.
3. See Bernard Brodie,"Strategy as a Science," Foreign Affairs, October, 1959.
4. Wintringham, Tom, The Story of Weapons and Tactics, pp 17-19.
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What about the organization in which the soldier operated and the decis-
ion-making processes which prevailed within it? The seclusion of the military
profession and the doctrinaire method of thinking combined in the long periods
between wars in the last century to freeze the military organization into
bureaucratic processes which did their part to embalm obsolete policies which
should long before have been recognized as dead. Command processes seem to
have degenerated into a job of passing paper orders down the line, waiting for
replies, and then passing down new paper orders. In this way the high comm-
anders thought, in their seclusion, that they were solving problems by thus
ordering solutions to be effected; actually they were only passing the problem
down the line.
But surely, one asks, there were new ideas: smooth bore cannon and cav-
arly are not used anymore. Where, then, did these innovations come from?
Generally, there seem to have been two main sources, civilians and junior
officers, or the enemy. Since custom dictated that a man had to have some
40 years practice in the military routine before he could be given responsie.
bility for strategic decisions, he was probably among the least suited to
supply the broad knowledge and outlook called for by such a position. He
had spent his life behind the wall of doctrine and what new ideas did come
forth from the "other world" burst upon him with a suddenness which regularly
precluded his ever understanding them. Thus it was typical that most innovations
should be offered and properly understood by only junior officers or civil-
ians.
An example of the other method of introducing ideas was the trench
mortar, which the British high commai vigorously rejected until the Germans
proved its effectiveness by the most indelible method available. For better
or worse, this method did not obtain in the case of tanks.2 The first method
wgs by far the most common, however, and points up the great contradiction in
1. Liddell Hart, B.H., The War in Outline, p. ix.
2. Swinton, op.cit., p. .06.
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in the military structure, that those most highly ranked and regarded men
are the least likely to originate and appreciate ideas, whereas those who do
produce ideas are the most likely to be scorned by the men above them.
One of the largest consequences of seclusion was that the soldiers,
like so many others, did not comprehend what the industrial revolution was
doing to power relationships between nations; they did not see the intimate
relation between military power and the harnessing of national resources
which was felt so keenly in imprecisely by such men as David Lloyd George,
who built Britain' munitions industry during the war.1 Out of touch with
the developing machine age, they were also unfamiliar with the characteristics
and difficulties which we of a later generation quite ra turally associate
with machinery. What effect this had on tanks we shall see presently.
At the top of the Army were two major policy formation groups; the War
Office in London was a civilian-military group of over 2000 people which also
handled all supplies, munitions, transport and other administrative require-
ments of war; the other group was the all military General Headquarters Staff
of the Commander in Chief in ,a given theater of operations. See Figure 1,
page 8. Colonel Fuller described the War Office as it looked to him in
1918: "Four years ago it had been a combination club,.monastery and office
in which etiquette domita ted, in which rituals were rigidly observed and in
which regulations, however out of date, were laws. Now (August, 1918) it was
a kind of Epsom Downs, a sprawling gathering of Generals, Colonels, lesser
fry, civil servants (over 12,000 in all) among e-ach class of which were to be
found numbers of cold feeted people whose one object in life was not to win
the war but to stay out of it... At 10 am on 1st August, I joined this ink-
slinging fraternity..." He quickly discovered that "there was no policy, no
plan, no coordination and no control: absolute ways and dogmas choked every
department... all things new were automatically pinced out by so many things
old." 2
1. Vagts, Alfred, A History of Militarism, p. 241.
2. Fuller, op.cit., p. 342.
Heavy Branch,
Machincgtn
Corps-Est.1916(
c~1
H-
D. W. 4-60
War Office,
London
Fig. 1- Organization of
British Army, showing
War Office 2: Western
Front Command
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As-we shall see later on, the War Office was terribly overburdened with
work, processing all of the administrative details for campaigns on over
half a dozen widely scattered fronts involving some seven million fighting
men. Some of its difficulties arose from the fact that both civilians and
soldiers were working under the same roof and the inevitable frictions arose,
especially in the top echelons. Yet civilian influence was sufficient to
keep the War Office from being a pure example of the military mind in action.
For that we must look at the Commander in Chief's General Staff.
The Staff was a group of 50 to 200 officers educated at the Army Staff
School in the administrative and theoretical methods of planning and carrying
out campaigns down to the smallest detail. The one we will be dealing with
was in France, undoubtedly the most important, and always referred to as
GHQ, General Headquarters. Here, as in similar groups, we find that the com-
plexity of operations with armies of over a million men forced command to
be fantastically fragmented; most of the actuil command initiative rested
finally in the hands of countless company and platoon leaders with never more
than 50 to 100 men in their charge. The men at the top were consequently
transformed into a board of directors, deprived of personal experience and
battlefield reality, completely at the mercy of their sources of information.
General John Charteris, the Intelligence Officer at GHQ for most of the
war, remarked in his diary for 7 April, 1917, that GHQ suffered from this
great weakness: all of the work was systematized into a routine and most of
it was done in an office some twenty miles behind the front. The members of
the Staff had the greatest difficulty breaking away from their desks long
enough to maintain close touch with the front. They could sometimes make a
quick auto trip to within ten miles, but rarely got as close as two, and almost
never made the hike over the last two miles to Visit the trenches. On this
date, Charteris remarked that it had been a month since he had m de this
hike, and this is the Intelligence Officer speaking.1
1. Charteris, General John, At GQ, pp 209-10.
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GHQ delegated its power so completely that at one high level .conference
just before a battle, the Generals told the Colonels to tell the Captains to
tell the Lieutenants and NCO's to, take the initiative and lead the men.
Having done with the tactics for the coming battle, the Generals spent the
greater part ofthe meeting debating what the men should eat the night before
the assault, porridge or muffins. This is a far, cry from the days of JEB
Stuart and Stonewall Jackson who themselves led the attacks of their small
groups.
One estimate of the men at GHQ declares that "The vastness of the material
and mechanical power available in modern war seemed to produce(in them a kind
of dull megalomania in which the ingenuity of exeGution was .sacrificed to the
immensity and elaboration of the preparation." Notice, though, that these
latter discriptions follow rather well what one might expect if this group
were to be made up entirely of soldiere produced by the system described above,
as of course it was. This was a group which found it easier to produce the
paperwork for "unimagira tive" sledgeamer blows than to think up a new kind
of attack,
I11. ,eople at the Top
Before we can o, much fugther we must know something about the individual
people who hold key places in the story. Sir Douglas Haig, the poma ader
in Chief, in France, was one of the Haigs of Scotland whose f. ily fortune
had been. made int whiskey some 100 years bef1re. He had passed into- Saindhurst
with litte diffic~p4y and, served as a cavalry officenrnffgca,, for several
years with much success. During the first years oftue century Hgig rose
through, the Ia"i 4,rIpy where he made a name as an. ad=hti aistrator and late in
the decade returapd to London to help Lord Haldane reorganize the Was Office.
When the war started;he was given a Corps,o Rd, later an Army, and when
Sir John French wa$removed as Commander in Chief in December, 1915, Haig
tookhis place~ni retained it fro the duration of the war. 3
1. Fuller, op.cit., p 169. 3. Blake, R., Private Papers of Douglas Haig,
2. Crtttwell, C.R.M.F., A History of the Great War, p. 260. pp. i-X-
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Although descriptions of his character vary, most of them agree that he
was clear headed, thorough and obstinate, "with an iron contempt for anything
showy, vague, or insincere; he intensely disliked politicians, among whom
he believed intrigue was almost universal."' His close friend John Charteris
describes him as leading a mechanical life; he was systematic in the extreme,
verbally uncommunicative, humorless, studious, well-read in military history,
and he considered himself 'the predestined instrument of Providence for the
achievement of victory for the British Armies."2 He was "unfortunately
a cavalryman"3 and believed that cavalry was the decisive weapon, while
infantry and artillery paved the way for the horse charge whid smashed the
enemy. We will hear again of this paving, which Haig called the wearing down
phase of a battle.
His colleagues agree that he had great difficulty expressing himself
verbally, though in writing he was quite effective. (The phrase "With our
backs to the wall..." comes from his famous dispatch in the Spring of 1918.)
This inability to talk effectively isolated him from his intimates at GHQ,
made it difficult for him to kake his ideas understood by his Army commanders,
and left him at a serious disadvangate in dealing with the more forensic
statesmen of London, before whom he had to defend most of his major plans.
In addition, he seems to have shared to a greater extent than usual the
soldier's tendency toward optimism. His colleagues, political enemies and
letters all testify to this tendency to emphasize the bright side and minimize
the dull when speaking to superiors of subordinates. He seemed to feel, as
we shall see, that he was doing all right without tanks.
Winston Churchill, the First Lord bf the Admiralty, displayed the same
forceful and determined character during World War I as he did when Prime
Minister in World War II. Sometimes in, sometimes out of the Goveenment,
1. Cruttwell, op.cit., p. 169.
2. Quoted in Fuller, op. cit., p. 136.
3. Cruttwell, op.cit., p. 169.
Ihe nonetheless made his influence felt through his friends in the Cabinet,
constantly writing letters and memoranda on many varied subjects. At the
outset of the war, as First Lord, he defined his job in the widest sense:
he intended to keep close watch on every phase of the Naval war. Yet he
also ventured into land warfare, presenting several theoretical papers and
even some suggestions for specific operations. He became, in a sense, a vol-
unteer general staff. He was a shrewd politician and his quick mind and
wit allowed him to "move like a panther" among his slower colleagues.1
David Lloyd George, a leading Liberal as was Churchill, differed from
both Churchill and Haig in his very humble origins. Rising through the ranks
of his party on the strength of his keen political instinct and skilfull
debating, he held in succession the posts of Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Minister of Munitions, Secretary of State for War, and finally Prime Minister,
which he attained in December, 1916 and held until 1922. He had a thorough
distrust for the ability of military minds, and most of the military minds,
conservative by instinct and political leanings, returned this distrust in full.
III. A New and Unexpected
Kind of War
Our background study now turns to the kind of war which this Army and
these men were preparing themselves to fight. After 1871, the standard
theory of what the next war would be like dictated a repeat of the 1871
pattern, a series of initial shocks administered with rapidity from which
the recipient never recovered. A decision could then be expected within a
year of fighting or perhaps less. This attitude arose both from a close
historical appreciation of the War of 1871 and of Napoleon's dictum that
attack power equals mass times velocity.2 Only the Prussians had followed
this dictum closely, but after the War of 1871, the French, having watched
their compact professional army trampled by the Prussian mass, built a mass
army of their own. The British, however, stuck to their professional fighting
1. Earle, E.M., ed., Makers of Modern Strateg, p 292.
2. Ropp, Theodore, War in the Modern World, p 186.
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machine until after World WarI started. This maintained the monastery-
like nature of the British Army far into the war years.
In the 1880's an American named Hiram Maxim invented a rapid firing
machine gun which was to have great repurcussions on mass armies. This gun
could fire between 250 and 300 rounds per minute, some ten to twenty times
as much volume of fire as could be dealt by the infantry rifle. The range and
power of artillery were also being increased at this time, and with these two
developments came a vast increase in the firepower of armies. Even though
the machine gun had the ability to make its operator equal to ten or twenty
or more of his enemy, and even more if he were hidden, the generals of the
time continued to measure and compare strength of armies in terms of absolute
numbers of men. The was in accordance with Napoleon and Clausewitz, so it
seemed, and kept generals from recognizing the growing evidence that numerical
preponderance did not any longer equal strength, nor did concentration of
numbers of men guarantee concentration of force.
As a matter of fact, military strategist did not really know what to do
with their new gift of firepower; the value of fire for defense was fully
recognized and yet the partisans of the mass attack, who were legion, felt
that morale, strong leadership at the lowest comnand levels (see pages 9 and
10), rapidity and energy of action, and surprise would maintain the balance
on the side of the attackers. Marshall Foch seems to have been the foremost
exponent of the offense and mass attack. An instructor at the French Staff
School in the first years of the century, he took his lectures largely from
Clausewitz and Napoleon. He was hardly alone in these convictions, however,
for most of the General Staffs of Europe shared them.. All felt that the
increase in firepower favored the offense.2
Around 1906, Britain began to consider its most formidable possible enemy
to be Germany and no longer France. Army policy thereupon shifted radically
1. Liddell Hart, op.cit., p. 71.
2. Ropp, op.cit., p. 200.
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from its traditional role of defense against invasion with a compact army,
(which task passed into the hands of the Navy) to that of conducting a large
continental campaign side by side with the French. At this time, then, began
both the increase in the size of the British Army and its now famons neg-.
otiations with the French Army.1
As a result of all this theory and negotiation, the war plans of all the
Continental General Staffs were offensive, and all ultimately failed. Of
them all, the Germans' Schlieffen Plan was the most appreciative of fire
power. Anticipating the terriffic casualties which fire power would cause,
this plan, more than any other, sought to gain a really quick victory and
came the closest to achieving it. 2
A quick summary of the early events of the war will show what happened to
these theories and plans: the Germans made a great drive on Paris, but it
died short of its goal largely because of logistic difficulties. They tried
to shift segments of their army back and forth along their line attempting
to achieve a concentration at an enemy weak point, but the distances were so
great and numbers of men so large that these movements were never quick
enough; units were usually late and caught out of position. The gaps thus
produced were poked at by the tired British and decimated French, but the
Germans wisely saw the futility of the effort and pulled back. The two ex-
hausted adversaries lay panting and staring helplessly at each other for a
spell and then, attempting to avoid the frontal attack which was being
thwarted by machine guns, began efforts to turn each other's flanks. This
again failed for lack of speed in maneuver; the armies merely played leapfrog
along the line until hastily improvised trenches, dug to avoid machine gun
fire, stretched all the way from Switzerland to the sea. With this, the
great and intricate plans for quick mobile warfare came to an end, smashed
by firepower which forced the armies underground. Since there were no longer
1. Ehrman, John, Cabinet Government and Wlar, pp 38-9.
2. Ropp, op. cit., p 204.
any flanks to turn, the armies weref orced to return to the frontal assault.1
After this initiak battle, the Germans turned their offensive attentions
to Russia, in the end a most profitable move, but it gave the British time
to raise a New Army of volunteers which would fight its first battle in 1916.
On the Western Front seige tactics were adopted by September, 1914, in the
belief that massed artillery bombardments would enable the infantry to
"walk through the German lines," according to Haig. Later on, Haig was forced
to admit the formidable nature of the defensive emplacements and therefore
prescribed even larger bombardments. By 1917, preliminary artillery attacks
of 21 days' duration were common. Yet this method of attack was never really
successful where the defensive emplacements were carefully constructed;
whole campaigns of a summer's lentgh netted gains no greater than five miles
at the cost of half a million casualties in most cases. Even a few machine guns,
carefully placed in the defensive line, produced an interlocked web of fire
which completely blanketed the front line area.
It had finally been admitted, then, that machine guns could lock the
front. After an attack one could observe dead British soldiers piled around
enemy machine gun emplacements like bugs around a light bulb after a suntmer
evening. Thus grew the attempt to blast holes in the defenses with masses
of artillery. This method seems to have failed for two reasons. First,
it made the ground between the trench lines practically impassible to the
infantry, removing the obstacle of barbed wire and replacing it with mud.
Second, the long artillery preparation required for any attack removed any
chance for surprise. The practicioners of the offense seemed to forget that
they had prescribed surprise as a requisite to attack against massed firepower,
and as surprise vanished:, they contined to pound away, not realizing the
enormity of the loss ofthat vital condition of sutcess.
*ass artillery attacks had another side effect. The great dumps of shells
1. Ropp, op-cit, pp 223-5.
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required precluded any great concentration on one part of the front, and made
it almost impossible to shift the attack to another sector. Thus we see that
not only was forward mobility eliminated by firepower but so was side-to-side
mobility. For these reasons, there was no such thing as a surprise attack.
Consider for a moment what is perhaps the most far reaching effect of this
method of attack: toward the middle of the war the British were firing off
about 10,000 tons of shells per day, on the average. This put enormous
strains on the productive forces of the nation and on the administrative
sectors of government charged with supplying shells and the guns to fire
them. In addition to guns and shells, of course, were countless other supplies
to be produced, including tanks. The supply problem was worsened as Lord
Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War, planned to raise his New Armies
from raw recruits instead of using troops from the Territories, as was later
done. This meant that each man and unit had to be equipped from scratch.1
As the struggle wore on, the defenses grew, more careful and thus more
formidable. Contentional seige tactics were insufficient because the def-
ense was not a solid wall of one piece, but a series of meshes, alternating
lines of barbed wire, trench and machine gun, barbed wire, another trench,
more machineguns, which had to be cut piecemeal. As the strength of the
defense rose, the seige methods were bloated in an attempt to cope with it;
as a reaction, the defense only got deeper, deeper perpendicular to the line,
2and deeper into the ground. Altogether, the great frontal artillery-in-
fantry attacks gained little ground and ate men and material at a fantastic
tate, unknown in the annals of warfare.
IV. S2Ritish Government:
Organization and Methods
The Central Government which had to face these challenges was, at the
turn of the century, as ignorant of their impending threat as anyone else.
1. Ropp, op.cit., p 227.
2. Sheppard, E.W., Tanks in the Next War, pp 16-17.
Most central governments at that time could afford virtually to ignore the
demands of war and were still not attuned in many respects to the full
implications of peace or war in an industrial society. The full meaning
of a nation at war fell upon central governments only after World War I
began, as the problem of controlling sectors of the effort led to ultimate
control over all sectors, until almost every aspect of national life came
under central supervision.1
The principle agent in the process of development &f the British Cabinet
system since the turn of the century has been a central committee system
which until at least 1920 was small-andyinformal. This system "revolved
a good deal-- even more tha* government at the center normally revolves--
around the contributions and interpia. of personalities."2 These committees
arose as the technology of war became increasingly complex. The many
ministries and departments which wege created in the first 20 years of the
century to dbpe with the problems of war administration called forth a vast
array of committees to coordinate their efforts.
Just at the turn of the century the Boer War kicked off this process
by revealing that the War Office (see Figure 2, page 18 and Figure 1, page
8) was entirely unfit to handle anything larger than a small colonial exped-
ition. It could not plan or direct strategic policy, that task having been
left to the commanders down in Africa. It was obvious that reform was the
order of the day, that a thinking body had to be introduced, similar to the
Board of Admiralty, Which could produce strategic policy.
The first workable attempt to supply the War Office with such a group
stemmed from the establishment of the Committee of Imperial Defense (CID)
in December, 1902. Its members were the civilian Service Secretaries, the
First Sea Lord, the Commander in Chief of the Army, the Prime Minister,
and the Service Intelligence Officers. Thus the CID was centrally oriented
1. Most of the following, except where noted, is taken from Ehirman, 6p.cit.,
2. Ehrman, op.cit., p. ix. Chaps. 1,2, 3.
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from the start. "Never before had sailors and soldiers sat together with
with Ministers on a standing Cabinet committee."1 The appearance of the CID
made War Office reform inevitable and in 1904 the Select Commission of
Parliament under Lord Esher made its famous report. As a result, the post of
Commander in Chief of the Army was abolished and replaced by an Army Council
similar to the Board of Admiralty, and the Secretary of State was given a
Chief of Staff. Soon after, a General Staff was established.
The CID, though it made much progress, did its best work in adminis-
tration. It was intended to be a study and advisory group, not one to pro-
duce binding strategic decisions, this function being left to the General
Staff and the Board of Admiralty, respectively. In addition, the CID was
at no time during its lifd accepted without question in all circles. It
was an uncertain and often slightly suspect group whose usefulness was some-
times called into doubt. Thus at the outset of the war, a powerful central
body with knowledge and authority for making strategic decisions was still
lacking; for the first two years of the conflict, strategic efforts made by
the Cabinet consisted of a "formless search for professional advice, based
on no proper system, which was henceforward to distinguish the conduct of
central bodies." 2 The Cabinet's effort took the form of establishing a
specialized commaittee to handle strategy for all of the theaters of opera-
tions; for this purpose the CID was useless since it had established itself
to concentrate on a single objective.
As the CID vanished from power (though it remained constituted), Prime
Minister Asquith created a War Council in November, 1914 with the intent
"to combine rapid and effective action with Cabinet responsibility and control. 3
This council had a varying name and membership, and usually was made of the
Prime ''inister, the Service Secretaries, their Military advisers, and several
l.Ehrman, op.cit., pp 28-9.
2. Ibid., pp 51-56.
3. Chambers, Frank, The War Behind the War, p 47.
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other members of the Cabinet chosen by the Prime Minister, depending on
how useful they might be in solving current problems. It took: its name
from the theater of operations currently commanding attention: War Committee,
Dardanelles Committee, War Committee of the Cabinet. See Figure 3, page
21.
These successive committees, though representing the government's main
instrument for coordinating political and military leadership, were nonethe-
less limited in their executive authority, since any great amount of such
authority had to be obtained or captured from the Cabinet itself. Since the
Cabinet was none too sure of itself politically, especially after May, 1915,
it was rather reluctant to give much executive power away. The War Councils,
being so weak compared to the Cabinet, were correspondingly weaker with
respect to the Service Departments. The appointment of an emninent soldier,
Lord Kitchener, as Secretary of State for War at the outbreak of hostilities,
an unprecedented move, caused the almost immediate death of these committees
as formers of strategy. In turn, he dominated the uncertain Cabinet and
virtually abolished the General Staff, exiling it to France to become GHQ.
He was then free to impose his highly personal methods on the department.
The amalgamation of the administrative and strategic functions in one man at
the War Office and their ambiguity at the Admiralty were equally disrupting,
and staff work was virtually at a standstill.
The organization for strategic decision, thus awkwardly constructed,
could only respond in jerks to the fast moving events. The Cabinet War
Councils, whose names changed so often but which were so similar, reflect
not flexibility but rather show an inadequate system reacting to situations
as they arose. Such was the problem presented to these people as a result
of the unexpected magnitude and complexity of the war. The difficulties
sprang up and grew faster than the government could grow to cope with them
and this, we shall see, is the story in most areas, not only central control,
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but munitions, manpower, and as we have seen, tactics.
This confusion soon began to take its toll: in May, 1915 the public
and the opposition Conservatives were presented with the failure of the
Dardanelles Expedition and the revelation of an acute shell shortage on the
Western Front. It was clear that changes would have to be made. To placate
the Conservatives, Asquith formed a coalition government and removed Chur-
chill as First Lord of the Admiralty for his part in the Dardanelles dis-
aster. To correct the shell situation, and concurrently to curtail Kitchener's
power and reduce his work load, he called upon Lloyd George to form a Min-
istry of Munitions, which willbe dealt with in *ore detail later on. Asquith
later rehabilitated the General Staff at the War Office (December, 1915),
calling it the Imperial General Staff (IGS) and recalling Sir William Robert-
son from France to be its Chief. Thus in two quick moves Lord Kitchener's
power and range of authority were cut back to proper proportions and staff
work began again. However, central control remained as weak as ever, and
aselosses to submarines and casualties on the Western Front continued to
rise alarmingly throughout 1916, the new government was soon forced out of
office; in December 1916 Lloyd George formed a new and more equally balanced
coalition.
Upon Lloyd George's becoming Prime Minister, great administrative changes
took place: within a month four new ministfries and three new departments
were set utp, mostly as reactions to the anticipated future mgnitude of
effort which the previous summer on the Somme had predicted would be necess-
ary, but also to correct the mistakes of organization entperienced in the
first two and one half years of the war. The uneasy alliance of Cabinet and
War Council was replaced by a small War Cabinet of semiyermnent membership
and great powers. Lloyd George intentionally made his ar Cabinet of men
unencumbered by departmental responsibilities so that it could function with
some freedom and could devote full time to the job. 1
1. Chambers, op.cit., p. 270.
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Yet even this group neither obtained nor sought rigid control over all
strategic decisions. It was Lloyd George's intention to allow the system
to function informally, permitting the detailed strategic thinking to be
carried out at the staff levels where it belonged. The development of the
staff system was therefore given a boost and made much progress during 1917.
Especially at the War Office, the Staff took its rightful place. Upon
Kitchener's death in June, 1916, the experiment of a soldier Sectetary of
State for War was abandoned and civilians held the post for the rest of the
war, ensuring the position of the staff. Yet all was not sweetness and
light: Lloyd George had inherited Robertson and Haig from Asquith's era.
The large casualty list from the 1916 battles on the Somme confirmed Lloyd
George's suspicion and distrust for the capabilities of his Chief of the
IGS and his Comnder in France. tnfortunately these two men were far too
popular with the Conservatives and the public to be removed. As we shall
see, "'loyd George soon found that he had to clip the wings of his newly
emancipated staff.
We must also understand some of the difficulties of government by
dommittee, which permeated all levels of government throughout the war.
Committees by their very nature seem to do much more talking than deciding,
Committees of both soldiers and civilians soon find that two languages are
being spoken tt the conference table. Committees of soldiers of different
ranks are regularly dominated by those who rank highest. Colonel Fuller
recalls vividly that many of the meetings he attended decided little or
nothing. Yet-neither he nor any of the *ther principals involved seem to
have doubted the efficacy of government by committee; we shall see them
forming committees at the slightest excuse. The proliferation of interlocking
groups of people coming from scattered spots in the government, representing
and defending conflicting interests and policies, produced some truly amazing
deadlocks and animosities.
- - -
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It is useful at this point to investigate the very relevant problem
of supply, both because it impinges directly on the development of tanks
and also because it illustrates quite graphically the committee method of
grappling with the enormous new problems which this war thfust upon the few
people at the top of the government. It will also ilnustrtet, as did the
description of the War Office, how difficult it was for these enormous
agencids to hold themselves together as their site increased so vastly and
rapidly.
Long before the shell shortage broke onto the public scene, some of
the men at the top of the government were becoming aware that the front was
not getting as many shells as it could well use. Over the period from Dec-
ember, 1914, to May, 1915, nearly half a dozen committees of rapidly increasing
size and urgency were set up to deal with this problem, all under the chair-
manship of Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer. Each committee
in its turn gave way before the flood and a newer, larger, and still in-
sufficient one was frantically thrust up in its place. The simple fact
which was making itself clear for the first time was that trench warfard
used up material faster than anyone had imagined.
Prior to-May, 1915, control of munitions supply was exercised by the
War Office, which meant Lord Kitchener. It soon became evident to the civ-
ilians in the government that 1) the soldiers simply could not direct such
a vast effort of manufactute, Organization and supply as this was going to
be, and 2) that the soldiers would not admit that the problem was going to
get that big, at least while Kitchedier had anything to say about it.1
In May the 'correct move was finally aade: .a separate Minittry of Munitions
was set up independent of the War Office and the Admiralty to direct the
entire munitions effort. Afteref ew brief weeks of doubt the new ministry
under Lloyd George grew quickly in its power and ability. This move was
1. Earle, op. cit., p. 290.
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one of the first steps in the effort of the civilians, led by Lloyd George,
to regain much of the control of the war effort from Lord &itchener and the
rest of the military.
The reaction of kitchener and many of the other military leaders to the
impendigg size of the war effort was to call for more soldiers, (The poster
of Kitchener saying "I want more men and more men and bore men until this
war is won" is as famous in Britain as that of Uncle Sam saying "I want you!"
is in this country.) Lloyd George's counter consisted of the two-fold
concept that not only were many more guns going to be required, but that,
parallel to the usual industrial principle, the employment of mechanical
aids would effectively multiply the number of men on hand.1 Whether the
new Minister of Munitions realized this explicitly or implicitly, there is
no doubt that he had no qualms about invading Kitchener's sphere of influence
in munitions supply and taking it completely over for himself.
The theory of military supply is a complex one and a short review will
help us understand what the 'linistry of Munitions stood for. The problem
involves the following five elements or processes: 1) there must be a need
for a kind of supply, and its extent must be formulated quantitatively;
2) there fol&ows development, experiment and modification of existing ideas,
or 3) independent and original research, to produce new ideas; 4) production
involves both state owned and private facilities, programming and supervision;
5) inspection guarantees the quality of the materials being produced. All
of these factors may be observed in the growth of the tank.
This simple division of elements is, of course, too theoretical; over-
laps are bound to exist. The overlapping, combined with the complexity of
modern weaponry and the large portions of the national economy required for
munitions production, make supply a very important and controversial prob-
lem. Inevitable difficulties arise between the supplier and the user over
1. Vagts, op. cit., p. 238.
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production schedules, promised delivery dates, the substitution of the
"quattity now" criterion for that of "quality later", and most acutely over
the relationship between design and strategy. Of all these, the last brings
most sharply to a head the great problem of who exists td serve whom.1 The
experienced reader will see instantly what difficulties can arise if one
begins with the assumption that the militfrf exists to ser*e the government's
policy, andyet a part of that same government exists to serve the policy of
the military. For he who calls the shots on design calis many of the strategic
shots as well; as such, it is possible for either of two groups which nom-
inally exist to serve to be in a great position to dictate, employing the
supply problem like a great Archimedian- lever.
Now, what actually happened in May, 1915, when the 'inistry of Munitions
was set up? The initial task of the Ministry was limited in the vital element
of need to a passive role: it was to supply and supply only, determining
neither the character nor the amount of the supplies. However, the Order
in Council which defined the powers of the 'inistry stated that the Minister's
duty was to supply munitions as requiced by the Army Council, the Admiralty,
"or as may otherwise be found to be necessary. 2 One can surmise that this
vital change was made at the instigation of "loyd George himself, who was
thus empowered to take the liberty, as he often did, to overproduce some
munitions on the assumption, rarely incorrect, that there would be an in-
creased demand later on. We shall see below how conflict arose when the
Ministry and the Army disagreed over hOw many tnks were needed. We will
also see that, because of the high degree of Ministry initiative in design,
the Generals never quite realized what was being built for them, in terms of
the tank' capabilities.
The Munitions effort faced many problems besides relations with its
customers. The supply of skilled labor was always short even at the beginning:
1. Chester and Willson, The .Qxganization of British Central Government,
2. Ibid., pp 222-3. Italics Chester and Willson' PP T  I0'
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skilled workers for the munitions vffort had to be appropriated from the
Army over Kitchener's loud objections. In 1915, however, it did not seem
as though the nation would ever run short of resources. By July, 1917,
when Churchill returned to the Government as Minister of Munitions, he found
the situation much changed. He entered a new world governed by a new king--
the priority list. For as the great factories which Lloyd George had estab-
lished were beginning at this time to produce and the whole nation was
becoming an arsenal, the great bottomless maw of the Western Front was easily
devouring the great rivers of supply which were now flowing. The most impor-
tant items in short supply were shipping, steel, skilled labor, and money.
Since the U-boats were taking their most terrible toll at this time, the
Navy and merchant marine got first call on all of these items. Only after
this could steel and labor go to guns, shells, tanks. and the myriad of other
1
munitions products which Churchill tried to supply to the Services.
Churchill found the Ministry a bloated organization, having in its hast
to meet the exploding demand, added a greater and greater number of peripher l
de.artments and committees (all impromptu creations) which revolved solidly
around the hub of the Minister, who was saddled with all central control,
coordination and responsibility. In order to ease ths load on :timself and
give him time to make long range plans, he redistributed this maze of depart-
ments into ten broad groups and set up a "Clamping Committee" to hold th-m a 11
together. 2
By the end of 1917, after the third summer of terrible losses on th.e
Continent, the shortages had become so acute that there were fierce bat les
for men and supplies between the Admiralty, War Office, and Air 4inistry.
The hardest fighting occurred in the area of manpower: both the ar Office
and the Admiralty demanded supplies by the thousands of tons and yet
demanded more fighting men, men who vere presently manufacturing those very
1. Churchill, Winston, The World Crisis, IV, pp 1-4.
2. Ibid., IV, pp 6-7.
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supplies. The Minister of unitions, thus caught in a cross-fire, was forced
to ask for the establishment of a Priorities Committee to arbitrate the
allocations among the services. General Smuts chaired this group and
helped to quell the fight somewhat.'
V. Atmosphere and Attitudes at the Top
Now we must look at the most difficult area of all these, that of how
these people at the top of the government and Army felt about each other.
Some pages above we learned that personalities were important in this story,
and we mustkeep this in mind as the story unfolds. For here at the top of
the Government, leading a nation of some 40 millions through a terrible war
was a group of hardly 100 men with an unbelievably enormous and urgent job
to do. The physical problems of shortages were accompanied by the mental
problems of anxiety, the pressure of time, the impact of events, and the
knowledge that in their hands lay the fate of their nation. A small scale
analogy to their situation would be a contest for their lives of threading
needles against time while bouncing on trampblines. The reader must feel
some of Churchill's humiliation upon being thrown out of the Government in
May of 1915; he must know the battle Lloyd George fought with himself at the
end of 1917 before he put out a draft call for 40 year old married men and
men thrice wounded; he must understand Kitchener's position upon seeing
his cherished prerogatives stripped away during l4915, until he was a mere
shadow of his former self; he sould go tb the appendix of Lord Beaverbrook's
Men and Power, L917-1918, and read some of the frantic and pleading notes
which these men scribbled to each other during the press of a parliamentary
debate or after a sleepless night of doubt and fear.
Even if the reader cannot comprehend the meaning of 320,000 casualties
incurred in capturing 42 square miles of mud near Ypres in 1917 (hardly
1. Churchill, op.cit., IV, pp 19-20.
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enough geound to bury the dead in), he can perhaps share some of the feelings
which these few men at the top felt as they tried to do their job, fight
and win a war. The situation was made more difficult as each of them
believed that the war could not be won without his plans and person being
employed. So deep were some of these convictions that Colonel Fuller once
remarked exasperatedly that it was next to impossible to argue with a man
(Haig) "who considered himself God's pessenger."
The story of high level relations is cut across by plot, intrigue, and
personal antipathies. Policies and decisions were never arrived at without
great interplay of a complicated set of forces which has yet to bg historic-
ally analyzed. However, three main coaflicts can be extracted from the
morass. 1) Easterners versus Westerners: This was a strategy conflict. The
Easterners thought that no way existed to break decisively the deadlock on
the Western Front, and therefore pushed for offensives in the Mediterranean,
Palestine, Africa, the Balkans, the Dardanelles, and other diverse areas.
The Westerners felt that since Germany was the main enemy, Germany and not
its satellites had to be attacked and beaten directly. Generally the East-
erners were civilians (Lloyd George and, in a different way, Churchill)
while the Westerners were soldiers (most particularly the team of Robertson
and Haig. 2) Soldiers versus politicians: This was a fight for control of
strategy and command prerogatives. Civil-military relations had been strained
ever since the Army had wona clear victory in prerogative during the Irish
revolt just before the war. These relations were stxained even more as the
growing totality of the war blurred the boundaries between the spheres of
the Army ahd the governmentb The d4fficult questions of military policy
also involved public morale and funds, manpower, and- great constitutional,
difficulties, all too auch for the soldiers to handle. In fact no really
satisfactory solution to this problem was found during the war.
3) Liberals versus Conservatives: This was a struggle for control of
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the central government, in which the soldiers took sides, mainly the Conser-.
vative side. The two parties were rather equally matched in power and relations
had long been bitter. Although both pledged their support of the war effort,
the old hostilities were not far below the surface. The Liberals feared the
imperialistic tendencies of the Conservatives while the latter feared the
former's pacificism and doubted their ability to prosecute the war vigorously.
As we have seen, the situation soon forced a coalition Government to be
formed, but the Prime Minister was a Liberal throughout the war.
In general, the main problems seemed to align the soldiers against the
politicians, and especially placed Lloyd George opposite Haig and Robertson,
The difference was in part temperamental: the politicians were daring, casting
their eyes about the world for offensive possibilities, while the soldiers
were cautious and tried to restrain this free wheeling attitude. Lloyd
George also shared more than usual the politician's contempt for the soldier's
mind, and v nstantly could be found trying to limit the military's prerog-
atives in strategy formation. Most of his later administrative creations, the
War Cabinet, the Supreme Allied War Council at Versailles, and others "had
that undeniable air of being intrigues intended to side-step professional
military advice." 2
Each group thought that only chaos and defeat could result from the
other's leadership. 3 Haig for his part considered Lloyd George "astute and
cunning, with much energy and push, but shifty and unreliable." A. Bonar
Law, leader of the Conservatives, was, in Haig's view, "a straightforward,
honorable man." 4
Before we discuss in detail the history of Haig-Robertson-Lloyd George
relations, we should investigate the general nature of the civilian official's
position. His job included maintaining public morale and confidence, and
1. Blake, op.cit., pp 31ff.
2. Chambers, op.cit., pp 260-1.
3. Beaverbrook, Lord, Men and Power, 1917-1918, pp 116, 187, and passim.
4. Haig's diary, quoted in Vagts, op.cit., p 237.
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thus he was often forced to exaggerate the successes and minimize the mistakes
of the military leaders; as a result the soldiers became demigods to the
public, and the ministers found it most difficult to control or dismiss
Generals in whom they had lost confidence sooner than had the public.
Consequently, the ministers were caught at the disadvantageous end of a
difficult power triangle. Another difficulty which civilian ministers had
in controlling, the soldiers arose from the great complexity of the new war.
Soldiers would bury any plan they disliked by calling forth a mass of tech-
nically worde4d and computed objections which ignorant ministers could not
bring themselves to counteract. Because the battle line had no flanks to
be turned, strategy degenerated into massed tactics which had to be care-
fully, painstakingly calculated. No layman could object to the presentations
of a commander who gave assurances that his calculations were sound. The
soldiers had, as a result of their domination of certain information sources,
a great deal of power. The only way the civilians could escape this prower
triangle was to await some defeat to befall the soldiers which was too great
for propaganda to take into victory; then they could take the opportunity
to call the Generals' methods or policies into question.
The specific conflict between Lloyd George and his Chief of Staff and
his Commander in Chief in France began long before Lloyd George became Prime
Minister. He took over as Secretary of State for War after titchener was
killed in June, 1916. immediately he felt cramped in the reduced power
position to which Robertson had reduced Kitchener, and though Lloyd George
had onee approved the reduction, he now resented Robertson for it. He
pressed for greater powers but did not receive them. His attempt was to
defend the ministerial powers against the growing encroachment of the soldiers,
but was also a reaction to the Western strategy of Haig and Robertson. It
is not surprising that upon becoming -..rime Minister he continued his efforts
to reduce the military men's strength, especially as their conduct of the
1 Cruttwell, op.cit., pp 625-6.
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Somme offensive had aggravated his low opinion of their abilities.1
The new Prime Minister was not aided in his efforts by the method
through which he reached the top. It was an intrigue-filled political
maneuver which involved scuttling the current Prime Minister and idol of
the Liberals, Herbert Henry Asquith. He had, as a result, little support
from the Asquith faction of his party and, at the outset, little tore from
the public. All through the remainder of the war he had to tread a'very
narrow path in order not to upset his delicate coalition. The Liberal Party
never did recover from this split of December, 1916. Lloyd George was also
hampered in his efforts to further Eastern strategic ideas, for those who
supported his scuttling of Asquith were mostly Westerners. His position in
the coalition was further weakened by the fact that the rank and file of
Conservatives tended to have the instinctive conviction that only the sailor
and soldier could be correct on military matters.2 Thus he was forced, by
his great lack of power, to retain the Chief of Staff and Commander in Chief
whom he had inherited, though his trust in them was daily declining. It
was a year before he attempted to challenge them.3
As the year 1917 wore on, the Cabinet had to approve Haig's plans for
protracted seige operations, though it had the greatest misgivings. The
Cabinet people were led to approve, it seems, by Haig's optimism and his
equally optimistic intelligence reports. All through the debate and battle,
Haig and his plans were staunchly supported by Robertson. But the War Cabinet
had to give its sanction and thus it assumed the entire responsibility for
the vast casualties which inevitably resulted from thialf "earing ab wn" phase
of the war. Their feeling of blood-guilt after the Battle for Passchendaele
(320,000 casualties in 1917) was as great as it was understandable. The
seige tactics produced only casualties, and that autumn, Lloyd George said
to Haig, "You capture a village in Flanders and Serbia goes smash. You
1. Ehrman, op.cit., pp 86-7.
2. Liddell Hart, op.cit., p 163.
3. Blake, op.cit., pp 40-1.
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capture another village in Flanders and Romania goes smash. Next week you
will capture another village in Flanders and Italy will go smash."1 When,
he was implying, would Haig produce such a smashing victory?
Lloyd George realized soon after taking office that straight-forward
methods would not suffice to remove Robertson from office and that nothing
would oust -aig. So the Prime Minister turned to more devious paths. At
one point in the fall of 1917 he deliberately consulted soldiers outside the
Government for long range advice, hoping to make Robertson resign, but the
staunch soldier held on in this spirit of no confidence until the fillowing
spring. He also began attacking Haig's staff, forcing the removal of some
of its high ranking members. A simultaneous atteipt to remove Haig was stopped
cold by the Conservative Secretary of State for War, whose threatened resig-
nation would have smashed the coalition.
Lloyd George finally found two keys to curtailing the military and their
seige tactics: remove them from effective command by establishing a Su'preme
Allied Commander, and rob them of fighting strength for an offensive by
withholding reinforcements. As a result of these moves, an Allied Supreme
War Council was established at Versailles, with Sir Henry Wilson as the
British representative, having orders to report directly to Lloyd George.
This was too much for Robertson, who was effectively cut out of the picture
entirely; he resigned in February, 1918. Lloyd George then recalled Wilson
to be CIGS, and since Wilson was the special nominee of 'loyd George, he came
under the latter's thumb quite effectively. The British collapse before the
German spring offensive of 1918 gave Lloyd George his opportunity to secure
an Allied Commander in Chief; in March, 1918, Marshall Foch was appointed.
The manpower shortage which Lloyd George imposed on the Western Front
remained in effect, however, with important results for the development of
tanks. We can see, then, that by December, 1917, Haig and Robertson were
1. Cruttwell, op.cit., p 499.
Kstruggling not only for men and supplies against various kinds of difficulties,
but they were also fighting for their professional lives and trying to prepare
for the expected German onslaught.
The purpose of all this has been to acquaint the reader with the per-
sonality of the British governing and fighting machinery and pepple, for as
we shall see presently, the tank was the very particular chij4 of a very
particular environment. The reader should also be aware of some of the
reasons why the tank was developed only after the war began. Like the
methods and agencies of government produced during the war, it too, was
an impromptu creation. The surprise of this war was too great to allow
anticipation of the conditions requiring any of these developments. .Many
factors conspired to cause the relative ignorance and lack of preparation
displayed by governments and nations toward the phenomenon which we now
call Total War.
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PART THREE
The Invention of the Tank
and its Development
Chapter I. The Birth of an Idea
As we begin the narration of the conception and development of the
tank, we should bear in mind that a nutber of varied developments may be
observed. The tank developed as a piece of mechanical engineering in Lon-
don, and as a tactical weapon in the British armies fighting in France.
The engineering development, whibhpassed through its fundamental stages
before those of the tactical phase began, was handled mainly by civilians,
in the government and in private manufacture. The other phase properly or
improperly fell to the soldiers, Generals of high rank on the Western Front;
when men of lesser rank tried to get their tactical ideas adopted, they were
usually unsuccessful.
We must also bear in mind that what is to be observed is the develop-
ment of an idea; the various configurations or tactical sorties of the
machine itself were merely symbolic of stages in the growth of the idea of
a tank. For a time the main thinkers of this idea were engineers; later on
the thinking passed into the hands of the Generals. The difficulty of dev-
elopment then arose partly from the difficulty each group had in fommulating
its ideas, and in the further friction, never overcome, which arose as the
soldiers picked up the first tanks in mid 1916 and tried unsuccessfully to
transfer this partially developed idea into their world of thought. This
transferkas.sinitially rather unsucces-sful, and the difficulty lay not with
the design, not with designers or generals, but rather in the fact that the
designers and Generals constituted a duality, at once a social, professional,
and geographic duality. When we combine this influence with that of the
overall environment (confused and often subverted command structure, pro-
liferation of deadlocked committees, overweening pressures of manpower and
L
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material shortages, and so on), we will begin to get an appreciation for
some of the problems of introducing the tank into the British fighting
machinery.
1. Early Experiments
The first design for an armored fighting vehicle was submitted to the
War Office in 1911 by a Nottingham plumber who dabbled in toymaking. It
was immediately pidgeonholed, only to be discovered after the war. On it
was found the comment: "The man's mad." In 1912 a Mr. de Mole presented a
design in many ways superior to the first one produced by official government
activities in 1916. The War Office returned the drawings to the originator,
but retained sketches. They were not referred to in the course of official
developments.
The first wartime inkling of such a vehicle seems to have come to
Woinston Churchill, in his capacity as First Lord of the Admiralty. He was
concerned with the defense of advanced Zepplin bases near the front and, in
August or September 1914, had a considerable armored car contingent in the
forward areas for this purpose. The Germans, however, were effectively
frustrating these cars by cutting gaps in the roads, and Mr. Churchill's
thoughts naturally turned toward a vehicle which would not be bothered by
such gaps. By October, however, the trenches of the growing stalemate were
presenting similar but more serious frustrations to the British infantry.
Since both the orthodox frontal and flanking attacks now appeared ineffec-
tive, some method of crossing over the trench obstacle was definitely needed,
and to this problem Churchill addressed himself. The form of the idea was:
trench-crosser.2
Tractor vehicles caught Churchill's eye in November, when he heard of a
design for heavy artillery mounted on and pulled by tractors. The designer,
Admiral Bacon, produced sketches for a trench crosser which carried its own
1. Liddell Hart, The Remaking of Modern Armies, p 283.
2. Churchill, op.cit., II, p 61.
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bridge, but subsequent tests showed it unsuccessful. Though this first idea
died, Churchill's interest was rekindled by a paper he received from Colonel
Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the CID. Hankey's paper was written in res-
ponse to suggestions from the official British War Correspondent at the
Western Front, Colonel Ernest D. Swinton. This paper Aaye an accurate
analysis of the nature of the stalemate and suggested something similar to
Churchill's trench crosser.
On 5 January, 1915, upon reading this paper, Churchill 4 ote Prime
Minister Asquith in support of its idea of desiging a trench. :rossing vehicle
heavy enough to crush barbed wire entanglements and armed sufficiently to be
a rallying point for offensive infantry action. Thus, with Swinton's help,
the idea grew. Asquith then passed the idea along to the Secretary of State
for War, Lord Kitchener, who seemed favorable, and who passed it on to the
Master General of the Ordnance. There the idea died amid questions as to who
might be consulted for technical aid; when no name was forthcoming, the
project was dropped. At the same time, however, in another part of the
War Office, tests of Holt tractors (see Figure 4, page 38) as supply carriers
were being carried out over some kind of obstacle course; these tests t1hey
apparently failed, for the War Office people involved reported that n&iod-
ification of the Holt machine (not the principle, now, but the machine)
would enable it to be successful. 2
Hearing nothing from the Jar Office, and expecting the worst, Churchill
initiated studies by his Director of Air into steamrollers to smash trenches.
Though this idea turned out to be mechanically unfeasable, it sufficed, says
Churchill, to get the ball rolling.3
Hhether it got the ball rolling or not, this idea was rather far afield
of the early ideas. In fact, the further studies carried on by the Admiralty
1. Churchill, op.cit., II, pp 62-5.
/2. Swinton, op.cit., p 163.
3. Churchill, op. cit., II, p 67.
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all seemed to be dogged by a lack of direction, as if the tactical purpose
which was being pursued was not actually very clearly kept in view. An
example of such a suggestion is Major Hletherington's, a machine which would
cross trenches on the principle of the large diameter wheel, which would
not get caught in the gap. The diameter suggested: 40 feet! No tactical
maneuverability such as that envisioned at the beginning could be attained
by such an unwieldy monster, and yet a one-third scale model had to be built
and tested before its unfeasability was realized.
Yet Churchill was a driver, and was determined to see action on his
ideas. On 20 February, 1915, he summoned the Director of Naval Construction,
Mr. Eustace Tennyson d'Eyncourt, a very capable engineer and administrator,
and directed him to chair a Landships Committee which would secure a solution
to the problem. When d'Eyncourt returned a month later with two possible
designs, one on the caterpillar (Holt or Pedrail) principle and one using
big wheels, Churchill appropriatedZ70,000 of Admiralty funds to the Land-
ships Committee for its use in development.
The name Landship was chosen partly to pacify any officials who might
inquire as to why the Admiralty might be designing land warfare vehicles,
especially as Churchill took the money without telling the Treasury, the
First Sea Lord, the Board of Admiralty, or the War Office. This last group
was kept uninformed until June because he feared that, as they did not seem
1
to like the idea very much, they might try to stop his actions. As Churchill
perceived, the earlier ideas submitted to the War Office made, no headway
largely because their instigators had no executive authority. Being blessed
with this power, he was determined to use it to make headway unaided and
unhampered by other government agencies. Thus the work proceeded almost in
secret: the British Navy, of all groups, was building land warfare vehicles.
Despite its appropriation, though, the project was quite small, carrying on
in a carriage house in the London suburbs.
1. Churchill, opcit., 11, p 71,
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About this time, Churchill obtained a valuable assistant for d'Eyncourt,
a banker named Albert G. Stern. Soon to take d'Eyncourt's place as chair-
man of the Landships Committee, Stern made his influence felt as a powerful
organizer who, because he was only a temperary Lieutenant, was not afraid
to say just about anything he pleased to just about anyone he pleased.
Stern immediately began handling contract arrangements with various civilian
manufacturers for the investigation of tractor mechanisms and other related
items.
Stern reports in his memoirs that among the ideas floating about the
Landships Committee in early spring, 1915, was one for a personnel carrier of
either the tractor or big wheel type, designed to carry about 100 men across
the trenches. The big wheel type was quickly dropped and when the Committee
made its fiscal report in June, it admitted that almost no progress had been
made; it had decided, however, that landships would have to be two-tracked,
double ended, powered by two engines, and would need a mechanism to cut
barbed wire.2 It appears from these last bits of information as though by
this time the Committee had almost completely lost sight of Swinton's and
Churchill's original a ins as regarded tactics. A machine with big wheels
or one to carry 100 men could hardly be a rallying pbint for offensive a
infantry action.
The catastrophic failure of the Dardanelles expedition plummeted
Churchill from office in May, and naturally his projett suffeted by assoc-
iation. The appropriation soon became known, and' was cut toy20,000, while
the new Board of Admiralty proposed dropping the *hole project. Only a
personal appeal by Churchill to the neW PiiSt 'Lrd, Arthur Balfour, saved
the Committee and allowed it to continue work on one experimental vehicle.3
On 8 June, 1915, the Landships Committee, with d'Eyncourt as chairman
1. Stern, Albert G., Tanks, 1914-1918, p 17.
2. Ibid., p 20.
3. Churchill, o.cit., pp 71-2. (vol II)
and Churchill as a sort of honorary chairman, decided that it might be use-
ful to ask the War Office what sort of obstacles a Landship should be designed
to surmount. This was the first formal contact the Landships Committee had
with the War Office, because Churchill's secrecy ban was now removed. No
direct answer to this query was ever received; other events took precedence.
At the same time, the Committee asked the War Office about weaponry for the
vehicle. To aid in its design deliberations, Stern and d'Eyncourt finally
decided to ask the War Office to send a member to sit on the Committee.
The Var Office responded by taking the whole project in tow and appointing
its own chairman. Now, including Churchill, there were three chairmen.
About this time also, the name of the Committee was changed to the
Joint Naval and Military Committee on Landships. The Admiralty continued
to supply the manpower, which the War Office refused to do, and these men,
called Squadron 20 of the Armored Car Division, numbering 50 men at the time,
grew to over 600 by the war's end. This group of sailors carried out all
experimentation, testing, and shipping of tanks throughout the war.2 The
Iar Office's refusal to supply men came from the Adjutant General, who also
refused to attend any trials of mechanisms by the Committee to which he was
invited. No explanation for this seems to be available, except that the
AG was overwhelmed with work trying to raise men for the NewtArmies.
2. Colonel Swinton Returns
By July, the Committee knew that all of its early designs were failures.
Although Stern makes no mention of it, a list of requirements for the vehicle's
maneuvering ability, received on 30 June apparently from the War Office but
actually from Colonel Swinton, seems to have helped the Committee realize
this fact. 3 Accordingly, it sought out professional help from Mr. William
1. Stern, op.cit., pp 22-4.
2. Ibid., pp 27-8.
3. Swinton, op. cit., p 163. The source, date of delivery and content of this
document have been pieced together from Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, from
Stern, op.cit., Swinton, and the Encyclopedia Britannica.
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Tritton of Foster and Company. After a few false starts, Tritton and Lieu-
tenant 0.G. Wilson produced a superior design on a modified Holt principle. 1
About this time, July, 1915, the Committee met Colonel Swinton.
Colonel Swinton, in his capacity as War Correspondent, had enjoyed
free run of the front line areaa since September of 1914, and had had plenty
of opportunity to observe the conditions and quantitative elements of the
stalemate. His first conception of an armored vehicle occurred on 19 October,
1914, when he recalled the reputed feats of a Holt tractor demonstrated
recently in Antwerp. His knowledge of conditions on the front led him to
believe that a modified Holt tractor, suitably armored and armed, could
break the wire, cross trenches and destroy enemy machine guns.2
This idea is far different from Churchill's or any of those subsequently
conjured up by the Landships Committee: it specifically was intended to destroy
machineguns, which, Swinton was convinced, were at the root of the stalemate.
Apparently no one shared Swinton's clarity of conception; only when his list
of design parameters reached the Committee the following June could the
Committee clear its head and design a workable machine.
Swinton was determined to present his idea at the very top of the Army,
Lord Kitchener, knowing that the idea would get respectful treatment if it
had the endorsement of the great soldier. Accordingly, Swinton went to
London to visit the War Office, but the press of events prevented a personal
interview between the two. Swinton lamented the lost chance to make a good
first impression where it counted most; we might note, though, that Swinton
was bypassing a great line of command in order to make this presentation at
the top. As we shall see, there was no lack of official methods: Swinton
merely ignored them. At all events, he had to revert to a written report,
actually prepared by the Secretary to the CID, Colonel Hankey.
Hankey's memo to Kitchener met with no approval, so Hankey rewrote and
1. Stern, op.cit., p 31.
2. Swinton, o.Ecit., p 79.
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enlarged it; sensing that kitciener could no longer be approached, he sent
it to Asquith and Churchill, among others, on 5 January, 1915, with results
described above. See Figure 5a, page 44. This was the "first seed." It
was also the first knowledge Churchill had of Army efforts. Swinton was not
to learn of Navy efforts until late July.
The second seed was sewn before the Engineer in Chief, France, who
seemed cool on the idea and did little to help it along. So, in February,
to accompany Hankey's encirclement of the War Uffice from above, Swinton
attempted to move in from below, approaching the Director of Works and Fort-
ifications at the War Office, General Scott-Moncrieff. He seemed enthusiastic
and passed the idea on to his deputy in charge of trench warfare, but the
General had his doubts. He explained to Swinton that it was Office policy
not to originate weapons or make suggestions to the Army in the field, but
rather to investigate projects at the suggestion of GHQ. This policy was
obviously part of the Office's theory on supply. (See pages 25-6)
Swinton found out only much later what had happened to his third seed,
and his coments reveal a great deal about both his theory of supply and the
W ar Office's. The seed apparently caused the technical people at the Office
to test some Holt tractors; they rejected them without telling the IGS. 2
This was a considerable blunder, and when it was discovered some months
later, the Office contacted the Admirdlty and joint action soon followed.
But the blunder raised comment from some quarters that the technical branches
had not "been put in their place" before the war and did not understand
their prercig&tivs; they adtt refer all questions of broad policy to the
IGS, and at this time they were forcibly reminded of "their place."
Swinton was told this by General Callwell, an influential member of the
IGS, and Swinton comments that Callwell was overemphasizing the ability of
the IGS to make such broad decisions when they involved technical problems.
1. Swinton, o pp 94-5.
2. This may have been the test refereed to on page 37. The data are very
unclear about dates of such tests and the exact people who performed them.
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The Staff always admitted that expert opinion was necessary, but in fact
experts were considered narrow and often did not receivi a hearing. Thus
the Staff often operated without sufficient information.'
We see, then, that in theory the War Office technical people could not
act on a suggestion if it affected broad policy (how could theyjudge this?)
without IGS approval (how could they judge?) or directive from GHQ, France;
if they attempted to do so, they were definitely stepping out of line.
Swinton, on the other hand, felt that the Staff might regularly discount
suggestions from experts, and since the technical people could make none
of their own, none might be made at all. The exact order in whidi the design
process should be carried out was obviously in dispute, for when the Ministry
of Munitions was formed a few months later, it was given the prerogative to
make concrete suggestions of this very nature. See page 26.
By April, when Swinton had heard nothing of his third seed, he despaired
of any progress and was even moved to contact a private individual, who
expressed sympathy but could offer no help. By June, Swinton was so des-
perate that he played his last card, "which turned out to be a trump."2
This was a memorandum to the current Commander in Chief, Sir John French,
entitled "The Necessity for Machine Gun Destroyers." In it Swinton described
the nature of the defenses which the Germans had built so carefully, and
stated: "The chief feature is the number of machine guns employed, and is
also the only novel feature: it has allowed them much econ&myof men while
enabling them to stop every British attack." The attack could be reinstated,
he said, by 1) sufficient high explosive artillery or, 2) a new means for
destroying machine guns. Since power for the first alternative was currently
lacking, he expanded on the second. He suggested petrol tractors of the
Holt type, with a speed of four miles per hour over flat, open country,
ability to cross a trench four feet wide, protection against armor-piercing
1. Swinton, op.cit., pp 140-1.
2. Ibid., pp.129ff.
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bullets, and armament of two machine guns and two light cannon. With such a
conf*guration, they could be employed on a large scale in a surprise attack,
having been brought up to the front on railroad cars. In the attack, they
would be spaced, say, at about 100 yard intervals over a three mile front.
A brief night bombardment would destroy any wire and at dawn they would
move on the German trenches, crush machine gun emplacements, cross the
trenches and lead the infantry through. Even if they turned out to have
little offensive power, they would draw much fire away from the unprotected
men, thereby projecting the attack and saving casualties. A significant
amount of unity between design and tactical employment was implied in this
memo, as we shall soon see. Note also that the memo constituted Swinton's
first attempt to approach the problem of convincing the hierarchy through
normal command channels, and the first which met with any success. The fact
that both correct and incorrect methods of getting things through the hierarchy
shared success and failure equally during the tank'-s development testifies to
the procedural confusion which prevailed.
Sir John French showed the memo to his Engineer in Chief, who evidenced
his lack of understanding of Swinton's ideas by commenting as follows:
"Caterpillars[which I have seen could go only at the rate of one and one half
miles per hour on coads, were very slow in turning, and nearly every bridge
in the country would require strengthening to carry them... It is necessary
to descend from the tealms of imagination to solid fact." 1  These objections
Swinton answered in a series of memos strung across the Month of June, with
the result that the idea was sent to- the lnventions Committee of GHQ, among
whose members were certain friends of Swinton's with whom he had discussed
his idea many times.
The Inventions Committee approved the idea for a machine gun destroyer
along with Swinton's specifications and passed the whole thing back to French
with their blessing. He, in turn, wrote to the War Office and (following
1. Williams-Ellis, Clough, The Tnk Corps, p 38.
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the method approved by policy) directed it to investigate and ask civilian
manufacturers to ascertain design parameters for weight, shape, size, and
the possibility of construction. Swinton thought that his was going at the
matter backwards (see previous remarks on method, page 45) for in France the
needs were known and, being an engineer, he knew that the design could be
fitted to the needs if only the War Office knew them. This the current
designers did not, as the actions of the Landships Committee clearly show.
As a result of Swinton's remonstrance, he was sent to the War Office to
explain his memo in person.
At this point it should be emphasized that Swinton's objection to French's
letter was quite fundamental. Swinton felt that a design could be worked
out to meed any reasonable request. The nature of this request was not
mechanical, however, but tactical: GHQ should properly ascertain its tactical
problem, describe the physical conformation of the trench systems, and ask
for a tractor, or other vehicle, to surmount them. Design engineers would
then produce a machine which would perform mechanically such that it would
succeed in the tactical task which had been outlined for it by GIQ. Thus
some tactical theory, even the most rudimentary, had to exist before the
engineers could begin. Swinton's memo contained such a theory, which he
later expanded.
Further, once the engineers had the tactical assignment, they were in
the best position to produce the machine and no further mechanical suggesticns
from GHQ would be very useful until a report on the first design's success
should be communicated to the engineers, enabling them to produce an im-
proved design. All of this was implied in Swinton's objection to the letter.
Yet there was this further implication, most fundamental to our under-
standing of the development of the tank: the machine thus produced could
be expected to perform adequately and according to expectation ONLY that
tactical task originally assigned, and ONLY under those physical conditions
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as were stated in the requirements. This is simply in the nature of machin-
ery: it is good where it is supposed to be good, and terrible everywhere
else. And yet this most fundamental point was not grasped by the Generals
at the front, who seem to have forgotten the tactical task which they gave
to the engineers through Swinton's memo. Further, it does not seem from
our knowledge of conflicting ideas on the design process discussed aboveV
that Swinton's implications were widely appreciated in the War Office either.
His thoughts on the order of the process also disagreed with those of the
Ministry of Munitions, and a solution to the dilemma, a carefully lexecuted
iteration process carried on between the engineers in the back areas and the
generals at the front, was probably never achieved during the war.
Under this ideal solution, proper communication would enable a machine
to be built which embodied tactical principles which thad been agreed to by
all concerned, and yet would exploit all the technical possibilities which
might be suggested independently by the engineers. Actually, when th  tank
was delivered to to the front, the Generals ignored the tactical principles
of the memo and the search for tactical policy was begun after it should
have been over, since a very definite tactical policy had already been
built into every tank. It is likelythat, though "GH1Q" officially approved
the memo, few if any of its members actually read it. This great infor-
mation failure was to have far reaching effects.
So Swinton returned to the War Office. As the post of War Correspondent
was soon abolished, he was made assistant secretary to the CID, en easy
job which gave him plenty of time to follow down his idea and also gained
him access to the highest places in the Government. He prodded his design
requirements through the War Office with the aid of Sir John French8s sig-
nature, and saw them apptoved.
One can see that the precision of these requirements must have been a
great help to the wandering Landships Committee: 1) The machine must be
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proof against rifle and machine gun fire, but not artillery, 2), must carry
one small cannon and at least two machine guns, 3) carry a crew of 6 (not
100), 4) be able to traverse craters twelve feet wide and six feet deep
and cross a trench four feet wide, 5) have a maximum speed of two and one half
miles per hour over broken ground and fuel for six hours' action, and 6),
travel by means of a track mechanism of either the Holt or Pedrail variety,
whichever proved best for marshy ground.1 For the time, this was the final
stage of the idea.
On 30 July, Swinton visited d'Eyncourt at the Landships Committee, and
for the first time personal contact was a de between the source of the Army
effort and the essentially Navy effort of the Committee. A few hours later
he met Stern and remarked, "Lieutenant Stern, this is the most extrgordinary
thing I have ever seen. The Director of Naval Construction appears to be
making land battleships for the Army who have never asked for them and are
doing nothing to help. You have nothing but Naval ratings doing all your
work."2 The situation, from the origins of its ideas to the personnel
carrying them out, must have appeared truly ridiculous. From this time on,
however, with the help of Swinton's design parameters and his personal
expediting around London, the engineering side of the development proceeded
somewhat more easily that before.
3. The Birth of Mother
The new design of Tritton and Wilson (see pages 41-2) was produced acc-
ording to Swinton's requirements with the exception that the obstacle was
changed to include a parapet four feet six inches high just in front of
the trench, a recent innovation of the Germans'. This design was at first
called Big Willie and then Mother, and was the prototype for the Mark I
series of tanks. See Figura 5, page 50. The most serious obstacle was
designing a suitable track, afid onee this was overcome in September, 1915,
1. Encyclopedia Britannica, XXI, pp 787-8.
2. Stern, op.cit., p 41.
3/ --
Fig. 5- Profile of British Tank
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progress on the pilot model proceded.1 This was not an effortless time
for Stern, however. He had recently succeeded to the chair of the Comm-
ittee, and was having difficulty obtaining contractors. Manufacturers were
reluctant to involve themselves with his work which, being experimental, was
necessarily subject to constant changes and cancellations. In general,
however, relations between the Committee and the world of manufacturers
and designers was a honeymoon compared to the tussle going on within the
halls of the War Office.
The formation of the new Ministry of Munitions was just effected at this
time (June-July, 1915) and according to its mission, it attempted to take
the guidance of the Landships Committee away from the War Office. It pro-
ceded only pgtt way, however, and Stern reports that its influence was slight,
although the resulting confusion was reat. For Stern was now involved
with three slightly more than nominal chairmen of his Committee and also had
to deal in undefined ways with three depaxtments in the government. Such
were the fruits of the fast growth of bqth the tank idea and thef orm of the
government.
By August, the War Office, Admiralty and Ministry of Munitions were so
tangled up in the affairs of the andships Committee that Swinton recommended
to Esquith that he call an interdepartmental meeting of the heads of these
groups to try to assign tasks, apportion responsibility, and generally clear
the air. As a fesult of this meeting, on 28 August, the Admiralty was given
responsibility for experiment ag4 designs allowing d'iyncourt and Squadron
20 of the Armored Car Division to wr k as before; the War office took charge
of promulgating design requirements; when most of the experimenting was over,
the Ministry of Munitions was to take charge of manufacturing and further
design development. This last changeover occurred in October, 1915, and
the Ministry took this charge quite strictly and forcibly.2 Here we see
1. Stern, pp 31-3.
2. Swinton, op.cit., p 169.
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an excellent example of the work of the expediter in the bureaucratic sydtem,
without whom no action might have been taken to clarify matters pekhaps for
weeks of months. Only a man in Swinton's position could go directly to the
Prime Minister and request such a convocation. We may also note that the
system as consitituted actually required an expediter in some cases to pre-
vent the multiplication of confusion,
As experimentation continued , a machine from the days before Swinton's
memo was tried against that paper's requirements and its failure was duly
noted. In the meantime, a wooden mockup of Mother had been built. There
was some dissatisfaction in the War Office, though, born of an everpresent
impatience, that things were not going fast enough. Poor Stern put the
steam onto Tritton and Wilson, hoping to produce Mother a little sooner.1
About 20 October, as the Landships Committee was being assimilated into
the Ministry of Munitions, it was suggested that the name be changed for
security reasons. d'Eyncourt suggested that since Mother appeared like a
large container, she should be called a water carrier, and the committee
named the Water Carrier Committee. Stern objected to this, observing that
since government committees were invariably called by their initials, this
title was "totally unsuitable." As a synonym, they chose the work tank,
and so the name came into existence.2 From then on, the committee was called
the Tank Supply (TS) Committee.
On 3 December, 1915, Mother made her maiden voyage across the yard at
Foster and Company. At this time her armament was determined as two Naval
six pounder cannon and two Hotchkiss machine guns, after much trial and
rejection of 6ther types. A trial of the six pounder showed the TS Committee
that its current testing ground was much too small, and Lord Salisbury was
persuaded to donate part of his park at Hatfield, near London, where all the
official demonstrations were subsequently held. The only serious difficulty
1. Stern, op.cit., p 44.
2. Ibid., p 39. Swinton claims, without refuting Stern, that he originated
the term himself some two months later.
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which Stern ran into came from the Master General of the Ordnance, who thought
ill of an organization which would ask him to supply weapons without con-
sulting him as to their pattern. He seemed "somewhat annoyed," remarked
Stern.1 Apparently the autonomy of the new Ministry of Munitions was getting
on his nerves.
Stern was finally able to report in mid December (just before Haig
replaced French as Commander in Chief) that he had a working model which would
fulfill the requirements set down by-the Wgr Office in Swinton's memo. As
a result, an interdepartmental donference of the CID, also arranged by
Expediter Swinton, met to decide the next step on 24 December, 1915. At
this meeting it was recommended that, after suitable trials of the proto-
type, if the Army Council decided that the Army could actually use tanks,
then a new, small Tank Supply Committee should be set up with power to ad-
ministrate the project of manufacturing tanks, to place orders with civilian
contractors, and to correspond with any government departments concerned;
this committee would residein the Ministry of Munitions, its auxiliary
personnel would continue as at the current time, and the War Office would
supply men to fight in the machines. The Admiralty agreed by lending d'Eyn-
court, transferring Squadron 20 to the Army, and promising to supply a number
2of six pounder cannon. Thus the tank effort, continued to be Part" of three
government departments,.
According to Swinton, it was near midnight after this- meeting had broken
up that he produeed the name tank. He said that for the last two months
previous the Committee had been called the Director of Naval Construction's
Committee.3 No matter who invented the name-tank, the uncertainty between
these two authorities attests to the confusion which apparently still remained
hanging about the Committee's very rapid growth.
1. Stern, op.cit., p 44.
2. Ibid., pp 47-8.
3. Swinton, op.cit., pp 186-7.
4. Colonel Stern's Triumph
Mother was completed in every detail on 26 January, 1916 and the tests
authorized by the CID were held soon after, the first trial being a practice
run over a specially prepared obstacle course and witnessed only by TS
Committee people and employees of Foster and Company. A few days later,
2 February, the big day arrived for the tank. Among the guests were Lord
Kitchener, Lloyd George, Sir William Robertson, and the new Commander in
Chief's Deputy Chief of Staff from France, General Butler.
The presence of Butler makes an interesting and informative episode
for it tells how Sir Douglas Haig first learned about tanks. Winston Churchill,
having been literally dumped out of the Government in June, 1915, hung around
in a sinecure post until December. By that time he was so bored that he
resumed his commission as a Lieutenant Colonel and went to France to see
some action. He took with him what he called "a good gift," a solution
to the current deadlock, embodied in a paper entitled "Variants of the
Offensive," which he delivered to the current but short-lived Comnander,
Sir John French. Even the title suggests that the paper was 'designed to
hint that current offensive methods could bear re-examination, to say the
least.
His suggestions were based on the fact that men needed some physical
protedtion while crossing the 100 or 200 yards of no man's land between the
trench lines. This, he remarled, "ought not to present insuperable difficul-
ties." He therefore suggested shields to be carried or pushed along the
ground, or armed caterpillars, which would cut barbed wite and dominate the
trench area. He noted that n1Mbers of the latter were ciriently being
built (not true) and that any action with them should be reserved until
there were a great many available. Action by small groups should be avoided,
he stated, for two reasons, one, because they were being designed to operate
in large groups and two, because he seems to have felt that they would be
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a one-shot device, or at least would lose most of their effect after their
initial use and consequent exposure to the enemy. Such crashing surprise
could never again be attained, and Churchill, perhaps as well as anyone in
those times, apprediated the importance of surprise and saw how thoroughly
the long artillery bombardments eliminated it. Caterpillars, on the other
hand, would eliminate artillery bombardments. It was all so simple.1
Very shortly after French received this paper, he was removed from his
post and Haig took over. The lack of continuity between the two commands
is evidenced by the fact that, although he was very near the top of French's
command, Haig knew nothing of tanks until he read Churchill's paper a few
days later. On a note clipped to this paper he wrote the following rather
pathetic question: "Is anything known about the Caterpillar referred to in
para. 4, p. 3?",2 And so General Butler was sent to London to find something
out about the caterpillar.
It seems as though this discontinuity may have played its part in keeping
Haig and his new Staff from ever seeing Swinton's original memo. Although
little information is available, this may be the explanation for the apparent
forgetfulness of the Generals at the front regarding the initial tactical
premises upon which the tank called Mother was produced. Further tactical
papers, moreover, rather than indicating that tactical theory had pre-dated
and determined the design, would instead make it appear as though, since
tanks would soon arrive, it was time to start forming tactical policy.
Thus Haig would have no way of knowing that tactical premises had been so
fundamental at the outset, or what those prenises were. He would also be
unaware that new tactical policies could not be formed after this stage of
design had been passed. However, the information is scanty and this remains
pure speculation.
1. Churchill, op.cit., II, pp 78-83.
2. Williams-Ellis, op.cit., p 41.
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The formal trial of Mother was held at Hatfield Park on 2 February,
1916, and was attended by some 44 officials in all. The tank wgLs described
as being 31 feet long, eight feet high, and thirteen feet wide. It carried
a crew of eight, weighed slightly under 30 tens, was armed with two six
pounders, three machine guns able to fire about 300 rounds per minute, and
was shielded to withstand German armor pieriing ammunition.1  After the
tank had traversed the obstacle course (see Figure 6, page 57.) with "complete
success" according to d'Eyncourt, 2 Stern remeibers that Robertson seemed
"well satisfied", and that Butler asked how soon some could be delivered
to the front. Lord Kitchener seems to have been less impressed, for his
well known reaction was, "It is a pretty mechanical toy, but it will not
win the war." Although tanks were' timately ordered in quantity by the
Army, the real attitude among the top command seems well stated by Kitchener's
remark. At all events, the Generals of the Army Council and GHQ went home
to deliberate and the engineerp sat about and kept their fingers crossed.
One thing we must emphasize at this point is the significance of this
test for the engineers and for the soldiers. Both groups agreed that the
tank had "passed" the test, but passage meant different things to each.
To the Generals, it meant that a machine had been designed which could move
over a certain obstacle course which looked similar to enemy trenches ex-
cept that there was no enemy.,. It was in a sense something li4e a trained
animal act, as far as the Generals were concerned.
To the engineers, however, it was a point of supreme success, for they
saw a weapon of certain tactical capability demonstrating a great part of
that capability with apparent effortlessness. To these men, the tank was
practically as good as proved in battle. Each group, obviously, was exagg-
erating its point of view, but the difference in point of view is what is
important; this difference, it seems, proceeds from the fact that the engineers
1. Stern, op.cit., pp 51-2.
2. Ibid,, p 57.
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Obstacle course for 2 Feb., 1916 tank
tests. Based on a diagram in Stern, p 298.
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kept more surely in view the relationship between design and tactical premises.
Although d'Eyncourt assured the Generals that the tank was capable of
great development, 1 he recommended their ordering some right away because
it would take some time before they would be ready. And so, on 11 February,
1916, GRQ cautiously placed an order through the War Office for 40 tanks.
Swinton immediately asked that this be raised to 100, since (another example
of the dependence of tactics on design, and of Swinton's implications) 40
was entirely too few to employ in the fashion which he had anticipated.
Large numbers of tanks could protect each other's sides in a way which small
groups could not do. Thus the order stood at 100.2
Soon after the order had been placed, the Army Council sent a note to
the TS Committee, d'Eyncourt and the Admiralty, thanking them for "evolving
a machine for the use of the Army."3 Although it was momentarily unclear
as to who would fill this order, Stern's experimental committee quickly
recast itself as a manufacturing committee and applied to Lloyd George,
the Minister of Munitions, for a charter to begin its operations, as per the
CID recommendations of 24 December, 1915. This very rapid shift, hardly
typical of bureaucracies, was characteristic of the energetic Stern.
After seeing the tests, Swinton revised his memo of the previous June.
In this new paper, he described more fully his idea of the mass attack.
The entire tactical plan was ultimately employed at the tank's triumphal
battle, Cambrai, nearly two years later, and yet the planners of that battle
did not see his paper until two months after the battle.4 The plan employed
apparently evolved from trial and error, from conversation with Swinton, and
from the same sorts of intuitive insights which came to Swi*ton many months
before.
So, ifi February, 1916, everybody seemed happy: they thanked and con-
1. This point,too, the Generals failed to appreciate during the war.
2. Swinton, op.cit., p 214.
3. Stern, op.cit., p 60.
4. Another example of poor communications in the system.
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gratulated each other, and awaited the arrival of the tank on the battle-
fields of the anticipated glorious and war-ending offensive of the coming
summer. Times were to change drastically, however, and with those changes
would come bitter months for the tank people.
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Chapter II. The Rise and Impending Fall of the House of Stern
1. Tank Production and Battles in 1916
The new power which came to Stern as he pocketed his order for 100 tanks
was increased when both Kitchener and Lloyd George asked him to bring his
committee to their Departments. Kitchener' s invitation completely ignored
the CID division of powers set down in August and reiterated in December,
and when Lloyd George pointed this out to Stern, the committee came to the
Ministry of Munitions.
Stern felt enough oats at this time to demand that certain conditions
be fulfilled and certain powers be accorded his group before he would come.
These he set down in a charter which Lloyd George signed, officially creating
the Tank Supply Department of the Ministry, while eliciting the counter-
promise that the order would be filled within six months. The charter, signed
the day after the order came through, placed the Department directly under
Lloyd George, granted it Squadron 20 and d'Eyncourt, and accorded it all
powers to place orders, incur expenses and have final decision in all matters
connected with manufacture. It 4lso granted the Department cortrol over
the design and development facilities of Mr. Tritton and Foster and Company.'
It was obviously a powerful group. Within days, =ontracts and orders were
written and work began.
Swinton had in the meantime been directed to command the tank force,
which was initially called the Heavy Branch of the Machine Gun Corps for
security reasons. His main responsibilities were to raise and train the first
contingents of the unit. As commander, he also had to communicate with
GHQ on matters of scheduling and shipping, and especially the very important
question of when the tanks would be delivered. GHQ, apparently rather ig-
norant of mass production problems, requested delivery by June, only four
months away. Not only would this be next to impossible mechanically but
1. Stern, op.cit., pp 63-6.
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also from the standpoint of training the unit and preparing all of its train
of repair facilities. So Swiston had to write Butler and inform him that
the first tanks and crews would not be ready before 1 August, a piece of news
which Swinton thought was "not what you would have liked to hear, but shows
the real situation."' GHQ's anxiety for tanks at this time seems a well
established fact. But their wishes were not to be fulfilled, for Stern
had many difficulties, mostly mechanical or manufgcturing bugs which were
ultimately ironed out, but which seriously delayed arrival at Swinton's
training ground of new tanks.
Swinton's training program was a true bootstrap cycle, an iteration
process starting from complete ignorance. Beginning by letting the men drive
the machines until they became familiar with them, the program then made
these first pupils into driving instructors to teach the next group. Tactical
doctrine was, of course, non-existent, except for 'Swinton's theoretical pa-
pers; early doctrine was perforce inclined to be mostly educated guess, in-
tuition and to a great extent, applicatiob of what were known to be the
machine's designed abilities. Traifting was thus very slow wotk and methods
were constantly changed.2 It became less haphazard after the first battles
had been fought and tankmen returned fiato Prance with new ideas.
Stern began to get his first tagte'of difficulty with the Army in June
when he tried to get his tank order raised substantially. GHQ put the stop
on this, saying that they could not order more until they had seen 20 or so
in at least a simulated action and jitided Wbether they -were satisfied with
the design. Swinton's answer to the GHQ letter which expressed these views
admitted indirectly that tank orders had already overrun the supply of engines,
uguns and ammunition. It appears as though Stern may have been trying to
feather his Mst, although it is undoubtedly true that certain sedtors of the
project would have withered without a greater flow of manufacturing going
through. This problem became aggravated as the manpower shortage got worse:
1. Stern, op,cit., pp 76-7.
2. Williams-Ellis, op.cit., pp 77-8.
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workers laid off a lagging tank program were snapped up by the Army, never
to build another tank. Swinton also told GHIQ in this letter that he was
running out of men for the auxiliary units of his corps.1 Since a unit of
this kind had never before been formed, Swinton had to feel his way, adding
billets as their necessity became known.
By mid summer, the TS Department was firmly entrenched in the Ministry
of Munitions, having grown its painful way from a tiny experimental group.
It had three functions: tank design, tank supply (materials and workmen),
and fgctory inspection and testing.2 Howdver, Stern soon came to the con-
clusion thgt it was "very difficult to work with a committee, some of whom
wished every point to be referred to then," He wanted to run the show him-
self and so he asked the committee to turn itself into an advisory group
(i.e., commit executive suicide), which it did, allowing him to take all
of the committee's responsibility. Upon obtaining approval of the 1inister,
3Stern becgme Director of Tank Supply.
W'hen we recall that Stern rarely soppe4 to consider during his con-
versations with Generals that he was y pnip officer, that he contin-
ually pushed for increased tank order a thgp a44t tenure at the Ministry,
and that he dissolved his committee and,Jqk ove himself, we can perhaps
get a glimpse of why the Wat Office, would soon tire of this man. We get
an unmistakeable impression that Stern was a bit of a Little QAesar and
that he, too, did not quite realize all of the problems of mias,,troduction.
ie did not, however, doubt the geexa4 efficacy of cbqzwitteps any more
than anyone else: when he annpuned that a new design for an artillery
gun-carrying tank had been evolved, z new committee was formed (while the
old one still existed) to supervise its construction. This committee had
the same chairman and nearly the same membership as the currently existing
TS Committee. 4
1. Stern, op.cit., p 83.
2. Williams-Ellis, op.cit., p 44.
3. Stern, p 85.
4. Ibid., p 81.
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GHQ's impatience for tanks continued to rise through the spring, and
Stern, Swinton and Churchill, anticipating that GHQ might try to jump the
gun, all wrote repeatedly to Haig reminding him that the tanks should be
saved until large numbers were available. Swinton finally got Haig's
promise on this, but the arrival of the summer and the Somme campaign changed
not only attitudes toward the tank, but towards the entire war.
On 1 4uly, the great attack was launched, and by dusk the British Army
had completed the most diststrous day in its history, receiving 57,000
casualties. Offensive power had risen greatly in the Army in the past two
years, but the German defensive capsbilities had risen even more. The two
week artillery preparation churned the ground ahead of the attacking forces,
and the result was a nearly impregnable defense.
As the weeks of July wore on, GHQ became concerned and then frantic
about its offensive; finally they informed Swinton that the first 20 tanks
delivered would be thrown into the fight as sogn as they arrived. The War
Office announced its intention to deliver sonxe toward the end of August,
although Swinton, Stern, Lloyd George and many others warned that 20 was
too few to make the full available effect of the weapon felt; training was
also far from complete. Churchill warned that the great surprise would be
squandered on a miniature effort, an utter waste o%' great advantage.
None of these appeals had any official stamp. an GH opinion prevailed
on the argument that if the faltering British morale coAiJ4 be raised by
using tanks, then tanks would be used. However, when yinton investigated
to determine how GHQ was planning to use 20 tanks (according to him, such
a small number did not exist tacttially: even 40 was too few), he learned
2that in fact GHQ hsd no tactical policy on tanks at all. Rather than em-
ploy tanks as Swinton suggested, they very likely desired to see a few in
action first, and then decide if many would be worth the cost and effort.
This was a backwards and fatal approach, as we shall see. Swinton, however,
1. Swinton, op.cit., p 260.
2. Ibid., p
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wrote no more memos; apparently he felt that he could do no more.
The first half company of tanks with their half trained crews went off
to France in Mid August. Some crews had driven their tanks while firing
guns simultaneously only once before going into battle. When they first
arrived they were regarded by officers and men alike as some new kind of
toy, and they were the object of'a great dekl of light headed joking. In-
stead of being taken seriously, thiey were thought of as a circus coming to
town, and many high ranking officers; having never seen any of Swinton's
memos, got no other impression of tanks.
One of the officers thus intr6auced to tanks was Colonel JFC Fuller,
At the time, he was an engineer, but he was soon to join the Heavy Branch
and become its formost tactica1'theo$st, 'since Swinton was soon removed
from his post in L'ondon and sent o'lo'geater tasks. The day was 20 August,
1916. Fuller had also just read GI' fist instruction memo on the tactical
use of tanks, which Fuller thouit ade "comn-sense reading", except that
we can see that GHQ had not prepared *his7miemo in anticipation of using only
20 tanks. Thus it really madetety little sense at all, for it specified
four uses for tanks, advancing le i rge numbers, attacking many
selected objectives in pairs or if, Ps, or simply as supply or mobile artillery
vehicles. Since 20 tanks emplofed on a wide front could advance only
in groups of two or three, tactil a e c'fienicy was reduced almost to zero;
further, groups which had baee tra~4d' together were broken up, lowering
morale and creating organizatic'hal contusion. This multiple difficulty
was to dog the tankmen in Pranc 1 hr 6&oibut most of the war.
On 15 September, these: ianks were thrown into the ight along the
Somme. The fact that so few were thoug t to be useful in the slightest way
testifies to the fact that aey were tually being tossed into a failing
offensive in an attempt to resuscitate it. They were sent forth in driblets
on a wide front over ground not suited to their characteristics. The con-
1. Fuller, JFC, 'Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, p 80.
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bination of poor conditions and incomplete training led to what has been
called a disappointing failure, for only a third of the tanks got as far
1as no man's land.
In places, howeger, they did valuable work and at some levels of cormmwand,
made a decent, if not great, impression. The intelligence officer at GHQ,
General Charteris, reported in his diary for 16 September: "The tanks have
been a very great success. I do not R1 i6 they woul hsve accomplished
so much against infantry that was, not, ata a low point as regards morale...
they have contributed very freely to our success in this fight." Later on,
though, on 20 September, he observed: "A god deal of the ene4y's fall in
morale is no doubt due to the tanks, but not all... Actually, the tanks,
though good, have several marked defectsrasd 4,4 vulnerable to direct artillery
fire. Several broke dewn mechanically, ,A* taat was to be expected..." 2
Although this is a slightly cqnf usedesmpntgy, it is far from unfavor-
able. Haig himself, in his digry for 15 Septevbez, rempr4 "Qertainly some
of the tanks have done marvels and have enab4. or atjagco.progress at a
surprisingly fast pace." 3  Yet, despite these a geob epopfs, there is
good evidence that the tanks were not considered a crucial or war-winning
weapon, at this time or at any other until very,-1eaM3 t end of the war.
Stern and Swinton visited Haig on 17 September an hp port that Haig
said in effect, "We have had the greatest victopy psiege the Marne... This
is due t6 the tanks. Go home and build as many tegs 4syou can, subject to
not interfering with the output of aircraft, and of railway cars and loco-
motives, of which we are in great need." 4
This conversation reminds one of The Kingfis4's famous comment on life
insurance: the big print gives it to you and the little print takes it away.
The tanks were given an inferior powition on the priority list at this date
1. Sheppard, op.cit., pp 19-20.
2. Charteris, op.cit., pp 164-5.
3. Blake, op.cit., p 167.
4. Stern, op.cit., p 96, and Swinton, o i p 292.
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and never rose-above it for the remainder of the war. Haig repeatedly re-
iterated it, and it prevented large numbers of tanks from being built in time
to participate in the war.
Haig definitely measured military strength in terms of men and artillery,
as several other entries in his diary indicate. When the crisis of 1917
hit the Western Front, he wrote to Robertson as follows: "There is only one
sound plan to follow, viz., without delay to send to France every available
man, every available airplane, and every available gun."1 Every available
tank? NQ. Toward the end of 1917, when British strength had to be sent to
Italy to prevent a catastrophy, Haig -thought again in terms of men and
artillery guns.
It appears as though Haig thought that tanks were useful and nice, but
never so important as to disrupt the pnoduction of vital machinery. No
serious, official attempt to change his opinion seems to have been made.
Indeed, it appears as though the British system of government and strategy
formation made this impossible. Other men couldabe approached, but not the
Commander in Chief; he could only be removed from his post, and that not
very easily.
Yet GHQ was sufficiently impressed with tanks to order 1000 to be built
for the coming year. This could not be initiated rightasway because im-
provements in design were being suggested from both-thetT8 Department and from
France, and much deliberation began. To tide the fgctories over and keep
the workmen busy, Stern had to order 100 more of the original design, Mark
I. While the deliberation continued, Sir William Robertson, acting on a
report fromnone of Haig's Army commanders, did an extraordinary thing: he
cancelled the order for 1000 tanks, without telling GHQ or the Secretary of
State for War, Lloyd George. This was 4 fatal move in the history of Lloyd
George-Robertson relations. Stern, feeling still bolder with his new order,
1. Blake, op.cit., p 236.
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went directly to Lloyd George, another extraordinary move, and demanded
reinstatement of the order, which he received.1 Amid wild uncoordination
and ignorance of normal command lines, the tank program inched its way
foreward.
2. Internal War Over Tanks
Stern's position was further fortified when the "inister of Munitions,
Mr. Montagu, created for him the title Director General of the Mechanical
Warfare Supply Department, and secured his promotion to temporary Colonel.
At the same time, the reavy Branch got a new comander to handle training
and relations with the War 4'ffice, General Anley (replacing Swinton), and
a commander of the fighting detatchment in France, Lieutenant Colonel Hugh
Elles. Colonel Swinton returned to the CID.2
This duality of command structure was soon to have interesting results,
especially as Stern was in fact the most powerful person in it. See Figtres
7 and 8 below. He was continually pressing for larger and larger tank orders,
and though he now had an order which was far too big ever to be filled,
as it turned out, he asked Montagu if it was really big enough. In addit-
ion, the design deliberations were not helped as Stern tried to push produc-
tion ahead and roll over the suggested chagges offered by the Heavy Branch
people in France. As late as Deceraber, 1916, Fuller recalls, as he joined
Colonel Elles' staff, a great arguaent was proceeding between Stern and
Elles' technical people over the position of the machine guns on the side
of the tank.3
Late in the year, a series of high level meetings between Haig or Butler
and Stern finally fixed the apportienments of designs in the total order of
1000. The delay, however, forced many of the new deliveries to be of the
unimproved variety. At the last of these fall meetings, a list of desirable
1. Stern, op.cit., p 106.
2. Ibid., p 111.
3. Fuller, op.cit., p 95.
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achievements was written and approved: 1) tanks were required in as large
numbers as possible; 2) larger numbers must be delivered by Play, if possible;
3) it was judged important to consider and adopt improvements in design
from time to time, but almost any design was better than no tank at all,
especially with the 1917 season fast approaching; 4) "It is highly desirable
that no other supply be interferedwith", and in emergencies, interference
was to be attempted only with GHQ approval.1
A more self-contradictory and confused set of goals could hardly be
imagined. It was thought desirable to build, and build fast, but to go
slowly aand ;llow improvements as well. It was desirable to build large
numbers, but not to interfere with any other supply. In case emergencies
arose, the 7inistry of Munitions was NOT to be allowed to exercise its pre-
rogative to apportion resources, but was to defer to GHQ. Thus both the
Ministry's charter and that of thetMeehanical Warfare Supply Department,
plus all dividions of power and responsibility previously agreed to were
swept aside and a new confusion set in.
Stern's production forecast for 1917, which was never achieved, read
as follows: January, 50 tanks; February, 50; March, 120; April, 120; May,
140; June, 200; July, 240; August'2UQ; September, 280, and steady thereafter
at 280. After March, 80% were to be of the improved version, called Mark
IV, and by August or September4psomt even better Mark IV's were promised.
Actually, the first Mark IV did not arrive until 22 April, and the first
Mark V on 23 March, 1918. Iw Detember, 1917, there seem to have been no
more than 500 tanks in France.
The failure of this ambitions program stemmed from several sources.
The low priority rating of tanks caused shortages in key components, mainly
in engines, which delayed Construction. Manpower for costruction
was 41so lacking, and would grow scarcer as the terrible campaign of 1917
1. Stern, op.cit., p 119.
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used up Britain's armies. When times became really crucial over the winter
of 1917-18, the cry for manpower was so great that the tank detatchment
was practically wiped out, in the factories and in the field., Small but time-
consuming design changes also seem to have cropped up throughout the year
halting production and forcing tooling changes.1
Other difficulties arose from the Ministry of Munitions reluctance to
build special tank building facilities, since the end of tie war was ex-
pected, according to Haig, rather shortly. Even this new and supposedly
revolutionary Ministry had fallen into the normal bureaucratic swigg which
it was intended to counteract. Stern also had trouble gathering the exec-
utive authority for his subordinates which was needed to put them in a pos-
ition to deal with Generals and other high officials. The War Iffice simply
refused to grant commissions to his civilian assistants or promotions to
many of his higher level people. His immediate assistants remained Lieutenants
or less throughout the war, although he was a Colonel himself.2
Yet Stern remained a very powerful individual at the coordiating center
of a vast interlaced conglomeration of committees and departments. Among
the groups directly involved were the following:
From the War Office- Ordnance Department, General Staff, later the
Tank Department (1918).
From GHQ- overall command capacity, the Experiments Committee, the Heavy
Branch.
From the Admiralty- Landships Committee, (dead by 1916). Squadron 20.
From the Ministry of Munitions- Trench Warfare Department, Inventions
Department, Mechanical Warfare Department.
Successive joint committees: Joint Naval and Military Committee, TS
Committee, later two executive Tank Committees.
In addition to the main actors, a grand chorus of Directors General,
Interdepartmental Conferences, manufacturers and workshop personnel.
1. Williams-Ellis, op.cit., pp 82-4.
2. Stern, op.cit., pp 117-8.
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When Elles took over as field comriander late in the fall, he found the
following organization in effect (see Figures 7 and 8, pages 70 and 71.):
there were two commanders, one in France, one in England. The former had
responsibility for commanding all operations, handling advanced training, and
arranging tactical employment in cooperation with the Commander in Chief.
The home branch was supposed to administer the tank effort as a whole,
provide men, supplies and preliminary training, and attend to maintenance
of personnel and machines. An early comimentator remarked that an experienced
reader could perceive in this "system of dual control a very promising sowing
of dragons' teeth." 1
By the beginning of 1917 the situation had grown intolerable, for Elk s
realized, and reported thus to the Wkar Office, that in fact there was no
central control of the tank effort at all, except perhaps for a "very ener-
getic" temporary officer in the Vinistry cf 'unitions. "The fighting unit,"
he reported, "is under a junior officer who, faute de mieux, has become
responsible for initiating all import-an.t questions of policy, design, org-
anization and personnel through GHQi and thence tlhrough five War Office branches.
The administrative and training organization is located 130 miles from the
War Office, with a junior staff officer in London to deal with the five
above mentioned branches." There was no one, he maintained, who had both his
own knowledge and Stern's executive authority who was in a position to guide
the affair; he therefore suggested an executive Tank Committee, composed
of representatives from all major tank groups, to handle the problem.
With Uaig's help, this was done, except that the people in France were
not represented. The membership, according to Stern, who was not chairman,
was far too inexperienced and bothered with other committments to give full
and useful control. So when it met for -the first timfe in i-archl, 19-17, S-tern
1. Williams-Ellis, op.cit., pp 80-1.
2. Ibid., pp 85-7.
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tried to convince this group, like his last one, to surrender its powers
to him.1 This it would not do. Stern and d'Eyncourt, gnawed by a growing
fear that the new Committee would "strangle" tank develppment, appealed
directly to the Minister of Munitions for an independent executive group
like the old TS Committee, made of experts who had "grown up with the project."
To support his call for independence, Stern quoted to the "inister all of the
occasions iince 1916 on which the War Office had altered his group's reco-
mmendations on allocations of materials, details of design, and other points,
only to find that the "experts" had been right all the time.
As the weeks of the summer went by and the existing committee, composed
of three War Office Generals and Stern and d'Eyncourt from the Ministry of
Munitions, was continually deadlocked, Stern pressed harder for a new Committee
with greater powers and more balanced representation, since he ahd d'Eyncourt
were usually outvoted. When Stern wrote up his demands as a memo in July and
distributed copies around the eabinet, the higher Generals at the War Office
were sd enraged that they demanded its withdrawal, promising improvements.4
This he did, but when improvements were not forthcoming, Stern prodtc ed another
memo, including his own summary of the tactical developments of the war thus
far, and demanding the extinction of the present Committee. This memo he
presented directly to the Prime Minister, Llcyd George.
When no help appeared, he and d'Eyncourt began boycotting meetings of
the Tank Committee. This was mid July. When Churchill became Minister of
Munitions a few days later, Stern again pressed his demands, calling the
present eommittee incompetent and conducive to complete chaos, but was unable
to get what he wanted. At this time, he also suggested interesting the
Americans in tank building, since the British obviously would never build
enough. Churchill remained sympathetic, but by this t&me a war almost as
1. Stern, op.cit., p 145.
2. Ibid., pp 147-55.
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great as that between the British and the Germans was being waged between
the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions.1
1. Stern, op.cit., pp 156-65.
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Chapter III. Through Mud and Blood
1. Tanks Are Machines
The main characteristic of the tank which the engineers in London
perceived most clearly and the Generals in France most imperfactly was that
the tank was a machine. The engineers knew intimately, as we have seen,
that they could build to any set of specifications, and had actually built
to one very particular set. The subtlety of their insight is that they knew
how valid was the truism that their creation could function properly only
under the tactical and physical conditions which they had provided for in
their design: they had buSlt the tank so that it would function well under
some conditions and consequently poorly under others. The Generals never
realized that, as a machine, the tank was actually dumb, mute, stupid. It
could do only what it was told to do, and only if it was told certain things.
It could not be ordered to keep a stiff upper track in the face of operations
in mud; its morale could not be raised; it could be depended upon to fail
unless used properly.
The Generals never realized how Proper "properly" had to be, and app-
arently no one knew how properly to impress this onto thei. Stiiking off
on their own, as we have seen and will see again, they tried to think out
for themselves a set of proper conditions and employamnts for tanks. There
was nothing wrong with the ideas produced, except that the tank had been
designed to carry out other ideas.
When the Generals quite naturally failed to hit the right combination,
they soured on the whole thing, feeling, as if they had tried out a boxer
in the ring and seen him knocked out, that the tank had been given a fair
trial and found to be no good. Once their method had rung up a zero and much
bigger problems began to press them, it was almost impossible to get the
concept of proper conditions into their heads; not that they denied the
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existence of these, for in fact they did, but rather that they never realized
how crucial was the fact that there actually could be conditions under which
tanks would operate better than under any others. This fact does not apply
to human beings, for example. Humans can be encouraged tq.great feats under
seemingly prohibitive conditions.
A great part of the difficulty in getting tanks used properly was due,
as we can see many years after, not to a case of marble1hea4ess d s has so
often been charged, but rather to a case of being unfamiliar ith the essence
of machines. This stemmed from a deficiency in the Generals' education and
adaptation to their environment, which had been largely machineless during
the greater part of their lives. In a way, the Generals never had. as Stern
said, "grown up with the idea;"? Stern, of course, meant something slightly
different, but definitely analogous. Those who were able to sed through
the situation were either educated in engineering or were gifted with a rare
insight.
The Ministry of Munitions, which took a great, even forceful, initia-
tive in creating the tank, actually did little to acquaint the Generals
in an official way with the tactical and mechanical nature of their creation.
Angry memos and unofficial statements from low level personnel, corposed
without the participation of GHQ, were simply insufficient to make up the
Generals dducational, technical and geographic disenfranchisemqnt from the
center of tank development. The tank people in Frgnce also tried writing
memos to the Generals, but these, too, seemed to be coming from the wrong place.
2. The Tanks' First Action
The events in France in the summer and fall of 141 earned the British
command most of its malodorous reputation, and most of the reputed problems
of introducing the tank are said to have arisen at this tike. The campaign
in Flanders, fought mostly in mud created by artillery bombardments, cost
over 300,000 casualties and many dozens of tanks while gaining little or
no ground. At the end of the year, neither tanks nor Generals nor prospects
of victory stood in any high regard.
By January, 1917, the Heavy Branch had acquired something of a per-
sonality of its own. Its arrival in France has already been depicted as
similar to a circus coming to town. Its men and officers were a rough and
ready crew, almost soldiers of fortune. Like the bombers of World War II,
their tanks nad names painted boldly on their sides, like Picadilly Lily,
Creme de Menthe, and so on. The commander, Colonel Hugh Elles, was young,
enthusiastic and elastic. He had a nice sense of the dramatic, and often
led tank attacks himself, like a latterday but miniature Nelson, in a tank
named Hilda. The personnel hid a tiec -pgrede if thkir unit and Were known
to be mu~h more vociferous in their alliegance to it and to their weapon
than most of the run of infariy utsn o r tfie -11ie.
One of Elles' staff officers was Lieutenant Colonel JFC Fuller, who
planned all operations and, in the vociferous spitit of the unit, exuded
a constant stream of written memos, pppers and instructions to his superiors
and subordinates alike on the subjects of tank employment and tactics, and
also on ttrategy and tactics of the war in general. To this day he remains
a strict and brilliant commentator who spares few people and minces few
words.1
Very shortly before Fuller saw his first tank in August, 1916, a friend
of his had described the strategic situation on the Western Front as a for-
tification 500 miles in length and five miles in depth, a mere pencil line
on a map, in which 80o of the German forces were stationed. A breakthrough
of greater than five miles depth at several points would precipitate an
advance which the enemy could never stop. Fuller combined this cdncept
with the fact of the tank and concluded that this was the tank's mission. 2
From this time onward he pressed this concept onto higher comnand circles,
1. Wilson, G.M., ed., Fighting Tanks, An Account, chapter 1.
2. Fuller, op.cit., p 79.
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that the tank could effect the long sought breakthrough, and for most of the
war he was ignored.
We can see, however, how great a jump this concept was from the most
advanced ideas of Colonel Swinton. The tank had been built to fulfill
Swinton's requirements, and even these were rarely if ever appreciated.
Fuller seems to have been far ahead of the Generals and most engineers for
most of the war. 'Jhile current tank problems were far from solved, he was
creating new challenges. Like Stern, he was "forcing the pace," as Lord
Milner was to remark Iater, and like Stern, he soon incurred the displeasure
of his superiors at GHQ.
He did not ignore the immediate prolems by any means. The Heavy Branch's
main tactical doctrine came from a paper of his written over the 1916-17
winter. It showed how tanks would operate in closespacked line abreast against
trench systems. It emphasized that most tank operations werellikely to be
surprise affairs, because the tank would be able to perform the artillery's
functions of wire cutting and trench cleaning. Thus the paper recommended
a 48 hour preliminary bombardment for an attack, which he later decided was
just 48 hours too long.
Copies of this memo were circulated to all armies and corps, to GHQ
and to the Heavy Branch. When GHQ read the heresy about short artillery
bombardments, says Fuller, they ordered the paper removed from circulation;
though it remained with the Heavy Branch, the rest of the British Army
remained essentially ignorant of the concepts of tank tactics. 1
The first large battle fought with tanks was the Battle of Arras, in
April, 1917. An attenpt was ade by the artillery comm.nder of the Army
which made up. the major infantry force in this battle to employ a 43 hour
1. Fuller, op.cit., pp 97-8. Fuller blames this on the corporate entity
"GHQ," and we must remember that the blame actually must fall on a single
individual. Historically he cannot be identified, so far as I can finc out.
According to doctrine, however, he is, by definition, the Comt ner in Thief.
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bombardment. GHQ strongly objected, and when he persisted, he was removed
from his post and replaced by another who agreed to a bombardment of 21 days.
The Generals were not quite ready to entrust the entire impetus of an attack
to tanks alone. Not only did doctrinal difficulties dog the planning stages
but Fuller also reports that tanks were in very short .supply. Those avail-
able seem to have been left ofer Mark I8s from the previous sumer, while
improved Mark IV's were not to arrive until after the bettle was e ariy
over.1
The battle itself, stretched actoss the nonth of April, involved only
60 tanks spread about a long front area. Their task was to make uniform
penetration easier by dealing with strong points. Generally they were used
in the tactically non-ex:istent group size of four or five. All 60 never
saw action together in a unified attack. No thought of using tanks to
exploit a breakthrough was contemplated. 2 Far from being fuller.-tInts,
they had yet to prove themselves conclusively as Swinton-tanks.
Yet Fuller, observing this battle, picked out an example in which
eleven tanks somehow found each other and advnced in line abreast on a
trench area. The* accomplished their Swinton-task so well in this minia-
ture action that Fuller was all set to go on and give them Fuller-tasks. 3
Tanks had fought but one battle and already he thgught that they were going
to win the war. He thus broke pace with the development in its early stages
and began to "bombard" (his own word) GIHQ with theoretical papers on the
subject of Tank Warfare, a concept of his own. 4 That GHQ should not have
had time to read and digest these very advnced ideas in the midst of the
press of events seems a foregone conclusion; yet Fuller was as persistent as )F
1. Fuller, op.cit., p 100. See Stern's production schedule, page 68.
2. Cruttwell, o p 407.
3. Fuller, p 109.
4. This paper storm lasted roughly a year and a quick count of references in
his memoirs shows that he sent at least 30 such papers, of which over Inlf
were classified as "long," meaning over 40 pages.
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he was vociferous, and eventually he ahd his ideas acquired a tather unsavory
name around GHQ.
The points which Puller was trying to push were that 1) tanks would do
well if only there were enough of them, if the had good ground to operate
on, and if artillery bombardments were kept at a minimum, and 2) tanks under
these conditions would do so well that it was worth while altering some basic
strategic and tactical concepts to achieVe the's conditions; i.e., Fuller
must have thought that tanks would win the war.
The tank's defects, however, werer miore widely appreciated than its
potentialitids and, as we now know, these defects viere substantial. They
were so substantial that Generals were loath t6'*rtist tanks, much less alter
strategic principles in their favor. Conditions~therefore remained bad and
consequently so did tank performance. Thus Fuller was arguing for a weapon
which was almost never in a position to live up to his claits and this did
not help his or the tank's reputation.
We might observe at this point that as late as October-November, 1917,
two Americans realized the substance of these defects. Majors JA Drain and
HW Alden had been assigned by the Ordnance Department of the United States
Army to investigate the feasability of Are rican entry into tank production
and tactical methods. While investigating, they had spoken to Elles, Stern,
d'Eyncourt and many others, and made these very revealing comments on current
tank designs:
"It is hopeless to build a tank tow ithstand heavy artillery fire, and
results indicate that this is not required, because tanks are rarely hit by
direct artillery fire until they have first gone out of action due to their
own failure in one of the four essential design elements: length, power,
flexibility, flotation."' Flotation involves the pressure which the tracks
exert on the ground: if the tank's weight is not distributed, it will sini:
1. Drain and Alden, Report of Investigation, p 9.
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until it reaches equilibrium. Flexibility means flexibility of control, and
is maximum when one man can drive the tank. "On October 26, 1917,... drove
up beyond Ypres and spent 5 hours on foot studying the nature of the ground
over which tanks in this theater of the war must operate (Flanders)... The
four fundamentals of tank corstruction were forcibly demonstrated here...
On all these points the Mark IV is insufficient. Mark V will be satisfactory
as to flexibility, somewhat improved as to power, but still inadequate as to
length ahd flotation."'
Of all the Englishmen throwing memos about, only Churchill seems to have
admitted these design drawbacks.2 The drawbacks indicate that even the most
advanced tank available for 1918 was insufficient in vital design consider-
ations. I have found no British statement on tanks as thoroughly clearheaded
as this American report. Perhaps Fuller, Stern and the rest were naive.
Perhaps they felt that, with official approval, design improvements could
come faster, if only tanks could have official approval. Thus these men
played up the vital necessity of tanks and played down their weaknesses.
When these weaknesses continuce to plague tank operations in strategic
areas, the Generals undoubtedIy were initially disappointed and later annoyed
as glowing promises and large-scale derands continued to pour in. The
Ueavy Branch's persistent demands for approval on the one hand anC the GeneraIs'
persistent demands for results on the other set these two groups into two
sharply divided camps which failed to conmunicate effectively w ith each othe
for some time. Each group steadfastly distrusted the other's opinion of taks.
3. Passchendaele
Apparently the tanks, though they had done nothing brilliant at Arras, )F
must have made some favorable impressions, for the Heavy Branch began to
1. Drain and Alden, o pp 20-21.
2. This admission came in the Munitions Budget for the coming year 1918, a
secret document seen only by the Cabinet. Churchill, op.cit., IV, p 31.
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be expanded to receive Stern's increasing shipments of tanks. Elles was rade
a Brigadier General, and many facilities and services were added to the unit's
complenent. However, attempts from within the Branch in France to expand the
unit very greatly, from 9000 men to 18,000, met with some difficulty. When
the proposal reached the War Office, it was returned to GHQ with the remark
that the extra men would come from infantry-bound recruits.
As the sumner was wearing on and manpower growing scarcer, this was a
most unwelcome bit of news for GHIQ. Haig consequently wrote in reply what
came to be the last official statement of tanks' priority rating (20 August,
1917): No men were to be given to the Heavy Branch from infantry, and tank
production was not to be increased to the detriment of airplanes, guns and
ammunition, transport vehicles or locomotives. Only at the end of the year,
after the tank success at Caimbrai, was this expansion approved. By that time,
even a 100% increase was too small..
In August the great campaign for the summer began for the British.
Fought in Flanders, it has been called the Third Battle of Ypres, Passchendale,
and many names unprintable. It was launched to maintain a stable front
while the French Army was suffering from widespread mutiny, and also to
strike at the Belgian and Dutch channel ports, from which submarines were
able to sortie. 2 Admiral Jellicoe had very recently dropped the "bombshell"
(Haig's word) that submarines would have to be s topped before the end of
the year or else the British would simply lose the wat.
So Haig suggested a frontal artillery-infantry assault similar to that
employed during the previous summer. The War Cabinet was really very ill
disposed toward the prospect of so many casualties, but had little choice.
Lloyd George may well have harbored an inner resolution to m.ake this aig's
last chance, for soon after this campaign failed, he began his various man-
1. Fuller, op.cit., p 114-6.
2. Cruttwell, op.cit., p 436.
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euvers described above, to remove Haig and his greatest supporter, Robertson.
There is also some indication that dissatisfaction with Haig's methods
came from other places besides ignorant civilians and vociferous tank people:
Haig's intelligence officer, General Charteris, remarked in his diary for
29 April, 1917, that he had just read one of Haig's appreciations of the
entire situation. "The general line of his paper," wrote Charteris, "is the
same old story-- go back to the first principles of war which means Clause-
witzl; wear down the enemy's powers of resitance --to such a state of weaknevs
that he will not be able to stand a decisive blow, and then deliver that
blow. D.H. does not think that the time has yet come for the decisive blow,
and that this is the cavse of the reent French failure. We have now to go
back to the wearing down process[ which means artillery, the duratidn of which
cannot be calculated. Tt all leads to the same conclusion; to keep up our
present pressure continuously all summer and then perhaps find Lord Kitchener's
forecast fulfilled, thatsomeday the enemy will not be there..."1
Yet we must not forget that our hero, the tank, had yet to be present in
sufficient numbers, had yet to be technically adequate, had yet to win
Generals' confidence such that it could be entrusted with the responsibility
of leading the major British campaign of the summer. Conditions, however,
could have been more propitious. The Heavy B ranch made every effort to inform
GIQ of the difficulties which would be encountered once a heavy artillery
attack was launched on the Flanders soil. it was only a thin topsoil, and
under it was a thick layer of clay. Local drainage systems were artificial
and sometimes undependable; not only the tank people but also native Belgians
gave GHQ repeated warnings that artillery would make the ground a complete
morass of mud, impassible by tanks or infantry. Mud, said Fuller, was never
fully appreciated by GH1Q as anaid to the defense.2
Yet GHQ was not unaware. Charteris told his diary on 4 August, just
1. Charteris, op.cit., pp 219-20. Italics original.
2. Fuller, op.cit., p 132.
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after the big battle began, "I went up to the front this morning. Every
brook is swollen and the ground is a quagmire. If it were not that all
rainfall records of previous years had given us fair warning, it would seem
as if Providence had declared against us." On the 9th, "The front area now
baffles description... It is just a sea of mud, churned up by shell fire.",
The Ieavy Branch began at this time to send daily "mud maps" to GHQ,
showing the front line areas and delineating the oceans of mud and the
continents of reasonably solid ground. Across tthe month of August the mud
areas spread, and finally GHQ ordered Tank HQ to stop sending the maps.
The official opinion on artillery had been delivered backon 17 June, 1917,
by a man known to have had some influence on Iaig, 2 General Hubert Gough.
Gough was a young cavalry officer in comumand of the British 5th Army, which
he had run into a fatal mudbog in the fall of 1916. le secms not to hve
paid much aareful attention to the details of his job and had to be removed
from his post in March, 1918.
At this point, though, he was delivering official ,ord, and what it
boiled don to was that artillery had been "conclusively proved" able to
stun the enemy sufficiently that an attack could break any defense sufficiently
bombarded. Initiative by the lowest command levels would then be able to
exploit the advantgge (we have heard this idea before.) until artillery
should be needed again. These are the tactics of the Somme era; many who
heard them were appalled, but they prevailed at Passchendaele.3
The resulting battle was a nightmare. Men and tanks sank uselessly
into mud that was sometimes two feet deep. Casualties ran so high that by
the end of the year the British had very few reserves left. This was to
have great influence on the tank battle at Cambrai andl on the following
spring's defense against the Germans' last major offensive.
1. Charteris, op.cit., p 241.
2. Cruttwell, op.cit., p 275.
3. Fuller, op.cit., p 135.
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An example of how tanks were distributed during the surmer is the
Battle at St. Julien. The Tank Corps, a new name since August, contributed
180 tanks to a fight which invclved three corps of infantry. One corps
had 36 tanks, the other two 72 each. Tactical groups were rarely larger than
two or three. At one point a signle tank captured several hundred of the
enemy, a preview of 1918 tank successes, but generally Elles htdc to admit
that because of the mud, only one tank in ten could be expected to reach the
battle area from the launch site.1 Tanks were designed to negotiate rough,
broken ground, but the name Landship did not mean, as Swinton observed, that
tanks were meant to be able to swim. Ghurchill remarked that another adverse
influence on tank progress was the fact that they were used again and again
in the same sectors of the front, allowing the enemy to get used to them
while receiving only small doses. As before, Churchill was surprise-con-
scious. 2
4. Cambrai: The First Large Scale Tank Success.
So, as the Battle of Passchendaele sank slowly in the mud, Fuller created
a plan for a prestige-raising battle, something which the British needed,
which just incidentally was to involve over 400 tanks, vittually all the
tanks available to the British.3 Yet, because of the strain of the current
battle, Fuller could not get approval to launch his battle until after the
main campaign of the year was over, which meant fighting practically in mid-
winter.4 However, permission was finally granted and a date set at 20 No-
venber.
Crucial to the plan was the location of the attack: the area was near
Cambrai, in the 3rd Army's sector, not Gough's 5th; the country was south
of Passchendaele and consequently dry and unshelled; it had never seen a
tank. It was agreed that there would be no artillery bombardment at all,
1. Williams-Ellis, op.cit., pp 151-2.
2. Churchill, op.cit., II, pp 82-3.
3. Fuller, op.cit., p 170.
4. Williams-Ellis, p 161.
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and this may have caused enough jittefs amid corps commanders that they
called every tank into the initial thrust. Thus there were not &nly few
infantry reserves but almost no tank reserves either.
The reader will immediately see the tank strength upon which this battle
rested when he is told that one corps alone had 216 tanks assigned to it
with 34 in mechanical reserve. Each division, of which there were three
or four per corps, got about 80 tanks; each brigade, of which there were
three to five per division, got about 35 . Altbgether, 474 tanks participated.
Compare this with preparations for St. Julien, page 85.1
On the first day of the battle, the formidable German defensive barrier
known as the Hindenburg Line was pierced and catured in an amazingly short
time. The trench and wire system was easily breached and the infantry, aided
also by the utter surprise of anartillery-free attack on a quiet sector,
advanced easily. In 24 hours, a penetration of 10,000 yards had been ach-
ieved, as much as had been gained at Passciendaele with 50 times the cas-
ualties in three months. The battle died shortly thereafter, however, as
the Germans regained their composure and counterattacked. Due to the fatigue
of the tank crews and the lack of reserves, the gains were lost again by
30 November; this did its part to decrease GHQ's opinion of tanks and Lloyd
George's opinion of GHQ.2
Despite the final outcome of the battle, the initial success won for
tanks several supporters who would stand then in good stead during the foll-
owing spring. It was only by making more such gradual inroads in the middle
hierarchy that tanks were finally employed properly during the 1918 campaign'
5. The Sudden Fall of Colonel Stern
and the Gradual Rise of "General Tank"
GH1Q was gripped in a near panic over the manpower shortage which followed
the 1917 fighting season. Lloyd George was deterrined never to let Haig
launch another offensive: Britain would wait a year before attem"pting an
1. Fuller, op.cit., p 186.
2. Ibid., p 207.
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offensive, and Haig would not command it. To implement this airi, Lloyd
George practically cut off the flow of human reiniorcements to the 'estern
Front. The quick coll.apses of Russia and italy had recently released many
hundreds of thousands of German troops who were expected to launch a great
attack in the coming spring. In the panic and realizing how Passchendaele
had decimated the Armry, GHQC tried to get men anywhere it could, following
Laig's equation which identified numbers of men and guns wVi th military
strength. One place they tried was the TankCorps.
In the meantime, in London, Colonel Stern had been having his troubles
getting big enough orders for 1918 tank production. His fight for a more
efficient organization was also being blocked. Soon after the attle of
Passchendaele but before Cambrai, General Gough had reported to the War
Office that in his opinion tanks were quite worthless; they could not op-
erate over ground as rough as battleground was bound to be, assuming stan-
dard artillery methods (his favorite) were used.1 This report, c)ming from
Maig' s protege, carried weight at the War Office, which announced on 11
October, 1917, that the entire tank effort had been a waste; there was no
evidence of progress or results. 2
When Stern got wind of this he literally blew his top. Churchill had
recently reconstituted the Tank Committee to operate more smoothly, ensuting
more effective and equitable representation, but this War Office report
appeared to be a major threat. As a result of it, tank orders were to be
limited to 1350 for the coming year and the Tank Corps held down to 18,500
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men, the limit set by Haig.
On the day Stern received these pieces of news, he forcibly vented his
views not only to Churhcill, but also to Robertson. Within a few hours
Churchill informed Stern that the War Office was demanding his removal from
1. 'illians-Ellis, on.cit., p 145.
2. Icks, R.J., Tanks and Armored Vehicles, p 98.
3. Stern, op.cit., p 168.
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office, and that Churchill, in order to establish peace and ensure domestic
tranquillity, was going to conform to the demand. Stern thereupon vanished
from the British tank effort, turning to the task of interesting the Americans.
His efforts soon produced a treaty, unique in history, for producing tanks
by joint effort of Britain, France and the United States.
But in the meantime the British tank effort was visibly aided by the
removal of this overforceful man. The advance of tanks ovcr their many
obstacles was eased by the more relaxed pace, apparent to all, which pre-
vailed under his successor, Admiral "oore. By December, the manufacturing
sector of the effort was moving much more smoothly.1
Churchill was nonetheless convinced that not enough tanks were being
built for the coming year. He therefore tried the more legal and executive
methods at his cormand as Minister of Munitions to secure for tanks a more
favorable place in the Munitions Budget which he was writing and would soon
present to the Cabinet." In a memo, Churchill emphasized the economy of
tank operations, showing that many more square miles of ground could be
captured with a given number of men if tanks assisted in large numbers.
With the impending manpower shortage, he urged that this man-saving method
not be overlooked.3
However, due to the Gough report, the general impression of tank
sinkings at Passchendaele, and the final outcome at Cabrai, the future
of mechanical warfare was very much in doubt over the 1917-18 winter. The
high command in France could not see taking men from the desperately needed
infantry to crew the almost useless tanks, and even contemplated abolishing
the Tank Corps altogether. The tank people were gcnerally making themselves
obnoxious by demanding what appeared to be more than their share of the
acutely short supplies of money, labor and steel. 4
1. Williams-Ellis, op.cit., p 191.
2. Churchill, op.cit., IY, p 31.
3. Ibid., IV, pp 98-9. He did not overrate tanks. See page 81, n.
4. Sheppard, op.cit., p 26.
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Fuller, as usual, led the Tank Corps' fight. He carried it to the
highest places in the government during the winter, completely ignoring his
position in the chain of comrmand. Not only did he visit Churchill cinstantly,
but also interviewed Sir Henry Hilson. Wilson was Britain's representative
on the Supreme .ar Council at Versailles, a nd was soon to replace Robertson.
Fuller was stumping for the formation of an Inter-Allied Tank Committee,
quite frankly to circumvent GH-Q's efforts to hold back tank development.1
In January, 1913, this group was set up, gaining high approval easily
since it fitted snugly into Lloyd George's plans to clip HIaig's wings. By
the middle of March these grandiose plans saw their completion as Marshall
Foch became Supreme Commander and Wilson replaced Robertson as CIGS. At
this point, Wilson, who was Lloyd George's special nominee, cane squarely
under the Prime Minister's thumb; one result of this was that tank production,
long a favority of the ex minister of Munitions, was increased greatly.
From this time on, Fuller and Churchill worked together to embarrass
GIQ by flooding France with tanks. 2  This, too, was rather easily accomplished,
since Foch, who thought rather highly of tanks at this time, was currently
requesting reports from GIQ on the state of the Tank Corps. Since GHQ could
hardly report that its London cousin had just placed an order for 4000 tanks
(8 March, 1918), while it was attempting to reduce the size of the Corps,
the tank effort in France was saved from being bled off into infantry.
(None of these 4000 and few of the original 1350 ever reached France, due to
the war's sudden end.)
Yet it appears that even at this time Haig did not re alize what tanks
were good for. Soon after this order was placed and just before the great
German onslaught began, lie told his diary, "19 March, 1918: Mr. Churchill
came to lunch... -e stated that, with the Approval of the Cabinet, he was
proceeding with the manufacture of a large number of tanks (4000). This
1. Fuller, opncit., p 233.
2. Ibid., p 239.
-90-
is done without aay consideration of the manpower situation and the crews
likely to be availablc to put into them,." H.aig felt, as did many of the
top soldicrs, that tile tanks would create a new manpower problem. Actually,
they would soon ease the old one.
It is interesting to observe that, while questions of who should deter-
mine the quantity of supplies usually hurt the tank effort, in this case the
confusion aided the effort. Further, we might notice that the arrival of
the fifth season of fighting had not seen a solution to this problem. No
solution would be effective unless it included changes in GIHQ organization
as well as changes in London. Personnel shakeups and organizational creations
seemed to have some effect in London, where they involved only civil servants;
changes in military structure were usually much more difficult to effect for
many reasons cited above: conservatism, personalities, the weak position of
ministers vis-a-vis Generals, and so on. Only after the war could such sweep-
ing changes be made.
6. The 1918 Campaign and
Tanks' Final Triumph.
The last phases in the arrival of the tank into the realm of adulthood
and generalacceptance came in May, June and July, 1918. In May, a design
was produced for a tank which would have an average speed of 20 miles per
hour. Here again was a quantum jump in the nature of the idea of the tank,
a jump so large that Fuller, not without good reason, felt that GHQ would
never appreciate it.
Instead, he felt that a separate Tank Department should be set up at
the War Office, which would control the fate of tanks surely enough to keep
GHQ from ruining the effort for lack of understanding. At this point, his
ability to communicate with GHQ was about gone. He must Inve realized that
he had shot his charge, so to speak, in his nany theoretical papers, pro:-
1. Blake, op.cit., p 294.
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ising to win the war with a weapon which had only barely proven its short
range worth.
So Fuller again went directly to the War Office, to deal with the
"farsighted" CIGS-,- Henry o.ilson. With him he took a tactical and strategic
plan to be imp&enented by the new tank. He was immediately asked to come to
work at the Office, reorganizing the tank effort from top to bottom and
producing for the Office's use an item which Fuller was satisfied had never
existed above the command level of the Tank Corps itself: a tactical doctrine
for tanks. The organization scheme, soon put into effect, produced direct
and short lines of communication between the IGS, the Tank Corps, and the
Headquarters of Armies which were using tanks. GHQ did not appear in this
setup. 2
The other big step in the tank's coning of age was the Battle of Hamel,
3 July, 1918. This was a small battle, but it coniinced Sir Henry Rawlinson,
commanding the 4th Army, of the tank's value. Only 60 tanks and two and one
half brigades of infantry were used, but all of the day's objectives were
taken within two hours, a phenomenal result. Tanks became heroes over night,
and they also gained something they never had before: they now IT1 d a spokes-
man who was agreeable to large numbers of influential people; Stern had
been obnoxious, Churchill politically suspect, Fuller too persistent and
far too quick-witted, and others too busr to make an effective effort.
But Rawlinson had friends at GHQ and on the TGS, and after Hamel it was
natural that he should take the tanks into his Army lock, stock and barrel,
and continue to use them in groups of 100 or more. His greatest turn was the
Battle of Amiens, 8 August, 1918. Here 688 tanks were thrown at the re-
treating Germans; by the end of the day a penetration of over 14,000 yards
had been effected and by the end of the week 22,000 prisoners had beed taken. 3
1. Though the war ended before this tank was completed, the plan was carefully
studied by the Germans; with the addition of the airplane, it became the Blitz.
2. Fuller, op.cit., pp 283-6.
3. Ibid., pp 297-317.
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Haig now fell into the swing of the strategy which och was putting
into effect. Tank attacks were throw;n at the enemy at several p laces u: and
down the line in quick succession, making use of the tank's ablty to be
put on a train and run 100 miles north during a night, unloaded and tossed
in somewhere else. These tactics soon cost the Grmans prisoners at a rate
they could not bear, and tiIs factor they freely admitted to be primary in
forcing their decision to ask for peace. 1 At the end of the War, Haig,
Foch, Ludendorf, and many lesser lights were praising the tank's prowess and
saying that it had contributed strongly to the Allied victory, which before
had been awaited vainly and now came with unexpected suddenness.
Yet even here we might observe in passing that the Generals, having
held out so long agaim t giving the tank any credit, were no-: ready to give
it really too much. Ie must not forget that in 1918 the Germans were a
broken and weary nation and arpy. Surrenders to tan",s were very likely
caused by a will to surrender, the tank being a convenient excuse. The
ability of an enemy who kept his head to defeat tanks was shown Can the
second day of the Eattle of Cambrai; in years following, it has been learned
that even an otherVise unarmed civilian can destroy a tank 7itl a coke
bottle of gasoline.
7. Sunmary and Concluding Remarks.
At this-point it is worthwhile sumarizing briefly what might be learneC
from this investigation. The main point is that the legend of :rleheaded
Generals is an insufficient historical e:lanation fr th2 r hich
tank develovnent met. We have seen many instan ce in 'Sc conand re-
lationships vere confused, smbi guous and ignored. inton's first four seeds,
the dual Heavy Pranch conranders, and Puller's trips to London are all
examples. Pure, unadulteratecd bureaucracy made any seemingly easy tasks
almost impossible: red tape, draft codes, deadlocked committees and blcated
1. Sheppard, op.cit., p 43.
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ministries were all results of the unprepared nation's efforts to rise to
an unexpccted challenge; the characteristic solution was impromtu, ad hoc.
The lack of firm central control of policy formation allowed the tank effort
tO drift on several occasions. In the absence of official policy, unoffic-
ial menos tried to do the job, but did not succeed.
Often the difficulty came from the people themselves: many were presed
by jealousies, antipathies and the impact of events. Many were simplyi in no
position to understand what was wrong with current tactics or what the tank
was all about. Understanding, however, did not break down as often as
comunication. Important memos failed to ot brCa c iculation. Certain
terminology and theories became taboo. Two impatient and semetimcs rough-
tongued individuals rendered themselves virtually incor'municado with the
powers of government and military command. Their ideas had to be taken up
by more politic individuals before they gained the support which they no
doubt deserved.
This last piece of knowledge indicates that, inasmuch as these two mien
in particular blame the Generals for not understanding tanks, considerable
blane must fall on these two for not understanding the Generals. Of course,
we must not neglect the very reals hortages of materials, money and men
which would not have been overcome in the large no matter how well anyone
understood the nature of tanks, the nature of war, or the rm.ture of demo-
cratic society.
hat we must look for in the totality of this story is the narration of
a typical problem, that of developing something really new (either in a time
of crisis or not) amid a mixture of democratic and authoritarian atmospieres.
This problem will always dog a democratic society which means to keep abreast
of its powerful authoritarian neighbors without having to resort to its
neighbors' methods. It must choose between the rather doubtful efficeJncy
of the mixed civilian-military, mixed democratic-authoritarian method, and the
more efficient but perhaps less original and creative full authoritarian method.
-94-
Biblioraphy
Beaverbrook, Lord, (Sir William naxwell Aitken) Men and Power, 1917-
1918, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1956.
Blake, Robert, ed., The Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919,
London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1952.
Chambers, Frank P., The War Behind the War, 1914-1918, New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939.
Charteris, John, At GHQ, Londcn: Cassell and Company, 1931.
Chester, D.N. and Willson, F.M.G., The Organization of British Central
Government, 1914-1956, London: Ruskin House, 1957.
Churchill, hinston S., The World Crisis, vols. II (1915) and IV (1916-18),
New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1923.
Crtttwell, C.R.M.F., A Histocy of the Great War, 1914-1918, Oxford:
The Clarendon Press, 1936.
Drain, J.A., and Alden, HOW., Report to Chief Ordnance Officer, United
States Army, November 9, 1917, hitherto unpublished. See U.S.
National Archives, Record Group # 156.
Earle, Edward M., ed., Makers of Modern Strategy, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1944.
Ehrman, John, Cabinet Government and War, 1890-1940, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Pressyi 1958.
Fuller, John F.C., Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, London:
Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1936.
Icks, R.J., Tanks and Armored Vehicles, New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1945.
Liddell Hart, Basil H., The Remaking of Modern Armies, London:
John 41urray, 1927.
Liddell Hart, B.H., The War in Outline, 1914-1918, New York;
Random House, 1936.
Ropp, Theodore, War in the Modern World, Durham: Duke University Press,
19S9
Sheppard, E.W., Tanks in the Next War, London: Geoffrey Bles, 1938.
Stern, Albert G., T 1914-1918, The Log book of a Pioneer, New
York; Hiodder and Stoughton, 1919.
-95-
Swinton, Ernest D., Eyewitness, London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd.,1932.
Vagts, _lfrcd, A History of ilitarism, meridian Books, Inc., 1959. "
illijams-Ellis, l-ugh1, The Tank 'orps, Uex 'hrL: George 11. Doran 2o.,
1919.
Jitson, G.M., ed., Fighting Tanks, An Account, 1916-19, London:
Seeley, Scrvice and Corany, Ltd., 1929.
,.intringham, Thomas 1., The Story of Weapons and Tactics, oston:
Houghton ifflin Company, 1943.
I.
)F
